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Conceptualizing Social Uprisings 
 
Sondos Shaheen 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Revolutions are an often-studied topic and various theories for their occurrence are found in the 
literature. Nevertheless, the ambiguity inherent in the term itself has meant that there is no 
commonly accepted definition of a “revolution,” which means that it is often difficult for 
researchers to compare their findings to those of others. To overcome this problem, this study 
provides a review of the extant literature on the topic, including that dealing with definitions, 
theoretical arguments, and types of uprisings. The end result of this literature review is the 
presentation of a working definition of “social uprisings,” which I argue is a more accurate term 
than “revolutions.” Social uprisings, under my definition, involve defiance against the 
government, which can be of either a violent or a nonviolent nature. 
 
Keywords: Definition, terminology, theory, phenomenon, wave, social uprisings, 
revolution, conflict, movement 
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1. Introduction 
An unanticipated series of events can capture the attention of researchers working in various 
fields. Researchers will then try to understand what happened and why. The “what” is the first 
step and if the “what” is not clearly defined, it will be nearly impossible to find out the “why.” 
Once the “what” is understood, researchers can then analyze the causes and consequences of the 
unanticipated events. 
The unanticipated series of events that are of particular interest for this study are social uprisings, 
for example, the 2011 social uprisings in the Arab world that took the rest of the world by 
surprise. Masses of citizens gathered in public areas to express their opinions of their respective 
governments, an unprecedented event in this area of the world, where freedom of expression is 
not the norm nor much welcomed (Kirat, 2005). Indeed, the World Press Freedom Index for 
2013 places the Arab world at a “deplorable level in the index” (RSF, 2013), which is even 
worse than it ranked in 2011. Daily coverage of the “Arab Spring” by major international news 
agencies worldwide illustrated how unexpected this event was and how difficult to understand. 
This coverage usually involved direct footage or experts expressing opinions and was sometimes 
far less than objective, which is, unfortunately, often the case with news coverage (Donsbach, 
2004, p. 131), and at times downright confusing. 
For example, among the terms employed by news agencies to describe the events in the Arab 
world were uprisings, protest, riots, unrest, and revolts (Applebaum, 2011; Spencer, 2011; 
Cockburn, 2011; Hill, 2011; Blackden, 2011; Shadid, 2011). That is, different terms were used to 
describe the exact same phenomenon, or in the words of one commentator, in short, “no one 
seems to know what to call this conflict—a revolution, a civil war or, in a translation of what 
some call it in Arabic, ‘the events: a shorthand for confusing violence’” (Shadid, 2011). 
At the beginning of the uprisings in early 2011, the focus of the news was country specific, 
starting with Tunisia then moving to Egypt. Nevertheless, the terminology used to describe the 
events was inconsistent even when reporting about the same country. For example, news 
headlines included “Egypt Riots Rock World Markets” and “Egypt Protests: Army Rules Out the 
Use of Force” (Blackden, 2011; BBC, 2011). Terms such as “mass protest” and “demonstration” 
were used synonymously. 
As the uprisings spread across the Arab world, reporting included even more terms for the same 
basic events: riots, power struggle, protests, civil war (Spencer, 2011; Hill, 2011; Bakri and 
Goodman, 2011; Spencer and Ramdani, 2011). The spread of the uprisings inspired reporters to 
create links and discuss spheres of influences (Evans-Pritchard, 2011; Whewell, 2011; The 
Telegraph, 2011; Watson, 2011; McElroy, 2011). No longer were the events referred to as the 
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Egyptian uprisings or the Tunisian uprisings but as the “Arab Spring” (Spiegel Online, 2011). 
The Arab Spring then began to be represented as something to be feared by Arab rulers due to its 
potential to spread democracy (Höges, Zand, and Zuber, 2011). This shift in analysis is a 
reflection of a wave of uprisings. The next phase of media coverage involved an international 
relations dimension. Now, it was not just the Arab world that faced the spread of democracy; 
according to a New York Times headline, for example, “Wary of Egypt Unrest, China Censors 
Web” (Wong and Barboya, 2011). 
The idea of revolutionary waves and spread of the events have an influence on foreign policy 
relations. Therefore, as a study of uprisings it is important to also consider the implications for 
uprisings. For example, in the words of another headline, the U.S. Secretary of Defense “Tells 
Bahrain’s King that ‘Baby Steps’ to Reform Aren’t Enough” (Bumiller, 2011). It is interesting 
how media report made links to various countries, including Morocco, Afghanistan, Iran, Tibet, 
India, Turkey, and China, by the use of phrases such as “a single match can ignite a revolution” 
(Worth, 2011). Eventually, the “Arab Spring” was compared to the color uprisings and the 
Kyrgyzstan’s tulip revolution (Dougherty, 2011). 
News media coverage of these events in early 2011 was a preview of the analysis the Arab 
Spring would receive in scientific journals. Taking a qualitative case study approach, researchers 
began to analyze the origins and implications of the Arab Spring (Bradley et al., 2011; The 
Economist, 2013; Doucet, 2013; Blinken, 2014). Other papers not only analyzed the possible 
reasons for the uprisings but also analyzed the role of social media and global outreach for the 
success of uprisings (Axford, 2011). Joffé (2011) analyzed the events by categorizing countries’ 
experiences as either nonviolent revolutionary movements or violent insurgencies. Dalacoura 
(2012) argues that comparing the Arab Spring to the end of communism in Eastern Europe is 
“premature,” stating that “there has been—and there will be—no serial collapse of authoritarian 
regimes leading to a democratic future,” as the Arab Spring was not a revolution but, rather, an 
uprising or a revolt (Dalacoura, 2012, p. 63). However, another scholar disagrees, stating that “in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, long-standing autocrats have been toppled” (Lutterbeck, 2013, p. 28). 
But these authors are only disagreeing as to the outcome of the uprisings, not over whether they 
occurred, and in fact, no one disagrees that both the Arab Spring and the Eastern Europe 
uprisings were unanticipated (Kuran, 1991; Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). The element of surprise 
is common to both; their differences lie in their causes and outcomes (Weyland, 2012). A 
country-by-country outcome analysis provides the strongest support for the argument that 
grouping the Arab countries together ignores important difference in the conditions that gave rise 
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to the unrest (Anderson, 2011; Sadiki, 2000). Perhaps Beck (2014) does the best job of 
summarizing the difficulty of not only reporting but analyzing the Arab Spring: 
 
The “Arab Spring” was a surprising event not just because predicting revolutions is a 
difficult task, but because current theories of revolution are ill equipped to explain 
revolutionary waves. (Beck, 2014, p. 197) 
 
This brief overview of the Arab Spring and how it was covered, first, by the media, and then 
later analyzed in a more scientific way highlights the importance of this study, the main 
contribution of which is to provide a literature review on the concept of social uprisings. The 
literature review is intended to result in a better understanding of what is meant by social 
uprisings in a global sense. Providing a working definition of social uprisings that is founded in 
both theory and fact will equip researchers to tackle a phenomenon such as the Arab Spring. This 
definition could be the starting point for future studies on the drivers and implications of social 
uprisings. 
Section 2 provides a review of current definitions of and theories about uprisings, in the process 
summarizing the evolution of revolution theory. Moreover, it discusses criticisms made of the 
extant literature and reveals gaps in analysis. Section 3 discusses the fact that most theories 
involving uprisings deal mostly with violent uprisings and points out that such a narrow view is 
unproductive; both violent and nonviolent uprisings need to be considered when studying 
revolutions. Section 4 analyzes how social uprisings impact international relations. This includes 
an analysis of external influences and the phenomenon of waves of uprisings, as seen with the 
Arab Spring. Section 5 provides the conclusions and suggests some areas for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The chief goal of this paper is to provide a definition of “social uprisings” that will be useful in 
later empirical and theoretical research. No such definition is apparent from the extant literature. 
What the literature does provide, however, is the general conditions, causes, and circumstances 
of a certain event, which is a good starting point for proper definition. This review of the work 
on revolutions highlights the important elements of social uprisings. 
One strand of the literature focuses on the conditions for success or failure of a revolution 
(Muller, 1985; Midlarsky and Roberts, 1985; Lichbach, 1989). This approach generally assumes 
that there is a common understanding of the term “revolution.” Although such analyses provide 
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interesting viewpoints on the reasons for the success or failure of such events, they do not 
necessarily provide an understanding of what a revolution is. 
In other literature, definitions are provided, but these tend to be idiosyncratic, that is, they reflect 
the author’s own understanding of the phenomenon (Goldstone, 2001; Tocqueville, 1955; 
Brinton, 1952). This approach provides a foundation for understanding the arguments made. For 
example, Goldstone (2001) defines revolutions as “efforts to change the political regime that 
draw on a competing vision of a just order” and “efforts to force change through 
noninstitutionalized actions such as mass demonstrations, protests, strikes or violence.” 
However, these statements do not actually define what a revolution is, but are, instead, reasons 
for undertaking certain action. Lists of the definitions and theories found in the literature can be 
found in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix. 
 
A. Term Use and Ambiguity 
The term “revolution” is ambiguous and used inconsistently, it was noted as early as 1926 by 
Yoder, a problem that persists to this day (Beck, 2014). As Goldstone points out, the “term 
revolution is frequently used with little care; as a result, it has become vague and slippery” 
(Goldstone, 1991, p. 8). Yoder (1926, p. 433) argues that due to the variety of meanings given to 
the word “revolution,” the “term is like a chameleon’s skin that is adaptable to each personal 
purpose.” In the literature, the term “revolution” is not confined to political studies but is used 
for various purposes in many disciplines. 
In political economy literature, the lack of a concrete conceptualization of the term “revolution” 
and other of its ilk led Starr (1994) to question the theoretical premises and label the previous 
literature “atheoretical” (Starr, 1994, p. 482). Waterman (1981) recognizes the common 
properties of various terms—“revolution, collective violence, group conflict, internal war, 
political strikes, turmoil, electoral mobilization and demonstrations” (Waterman, 1981, p.554)—
and comes up with an umbrella phrase to cover all of them: actions of mass political movements. 
The following quote shows that other scholars have also recognized the similar meaning of 
various terms used to describe a revolution. “Social revolutions often possess characteristics that 
may also be present in unsuccessful revolutions, rebellions, riots, and ordinary cycles of protest” 
(Tarrow, 1995, p. 472). 
Nonetheless, the most commonly used term is revolution, although it remains controversial. For 
example, Land (2007) argues that if a revolutionary action is the community’s rejection of rules 
set by the authorities, then it is valid to argue that pirate activity during the golden ages, in early 
18th century, should be also considered a revolutionary. 
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According to Gyánia (2008), some scholars argue that the term “revolution” was first used to 
describe the events in France in 1789, and they define it to mean a forceful collective effort to 
topple the regime (Gyánia, 2008). In truth, however, the term first received it political 
connotations after the Glorious Revolution, which occurred  in 1688, a century earlier than the 
French Revolution (Schwoerer, 2004). This political characterization of the terminology is 
credited to “lexicographers like Edward Philips, John Kersey and Samuel Johnson” (Snow, 1962, 
p. 163). However, when the term was first used and for what has very little to do with what it 
stands for--that is, there were revolutions long before anyone called them revolutions for 
example, the plebeian secession that occurred in 449 BC (Schock, 2013). Indeed, according to 
Lipsky (1976), there have been uprisings for as long as there has been something to rise up 
against. 
A review of the origins and first use of the term revolution goes some distance to explaining why 
the term is so ambiguous. The concept of revolution is an offshoot of the Latin word revolvo 
(Souter, 1998), which "evolved through the centuries from a simple, rather obscure, Latin word 
denoting the periodic return of a moving object (or person) to the point of origin, to a widely 
used and complex doctrine of political action.” (Snow, 1962, p. 167).  
Based on this early understanding of revolutions being of a cyclical nature, mid-seventeenth 
century authors did not view political shifts as revolutions. They considered a political shift to be 
forceful action engaged in for the purpose of obtaining the ruling position. In the seventeenth 
century, Galileo’s “astronomical meaning” of the term “revolution” predominated over all other 
definitions (Cohen, 1985, p. 393). Galileo defines revolution as a cycle of contribution. The 
action of taking over the governing power is then seen as a result of a cycle of political conflicts 
(Hartman, 1986, p. 495). 
Abandoning the seventeenth-century idea of cyclicality, eighteenth-century authors used the term 
“revolution” to only refer to a change of real magnitude and a breach of continuity (Cohen, 
1976). This approach is supported by Weber's (1974) explanation of an authentic revolution that 
it is a set of actions that causes a change in history in a limited period of time.  
Some twentieth-century qualitative studies of revolution use the eighteenth-century definition of 
revolution as change (Hagopian, 1974; Tilly, 1991; Krejčí, 1994). These authors find revolutions 
to be an irregular political challenge, such as a coup d’état or popular uprising (Tilly, 1991), 
which, however, does not necessarily have a revolutionary outcome (Siani-Davies, 1996). 
Recent studies of revolutions demonstrate that nearly every successful revolution ended up 
betraying the principles upon which it was founded (Land, 2007). Hakim Bey (2001) questions 
whether revolution does culminate in a desirable goal for the opposition, preferring the “term 
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‘insurrection.’ The term insurrection is used by historians to label failed revolutions (Hakim Bey, 
2001, p.403). A successful revolution changes the ruling power via a “multi-class coalition”; 
however, such success is not long lived as the different groups will reject “the shape of the new 
order” (Foran, 1992, p. 11). Therefore, the cyclical nature of revolution continues even after a 
power shift: the subjects will not stay satisfied for long, and a new cycle will begin. 
From the such explanation of failed revolutions the seventeenth century cyclical understanding 
of revolutionary movement is conceptually still viable. A political shift does not mean an end to 
the revolution cycle because dissatisfied opposition from failed revolution makes the opposition 
in a continuous cycle of revolution.  
 
 
B. Generations of Revolution Theories 
This section is organized based on Goldstone’s (1980) classification of revolution theories into 
three generations. The generations are not only time specific, they are also theme specific, 
reflecting the view of revolution prevalent in each time period (Shugart, 1989; Goldstone, 1980). 
 
a. First Generation 
The first generation covers the period from 1900 until 1940. This generation views the pattern of 
revolutions as a reflection of basic needs, although the work done in this period lacks a general 
encompassing theoretical perspective. This generation’s major contribution is The Process of 
Revolution by George Pettee. Pettee provides a detailed summary of earlier work, starting from 
Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories of punishment of the classes (Pettee, 1938). For Pettee, a 
revolution is the “reconstruction of the state,” not only via change of the ruling power, but also 
through changing the class structure of the society. According to Pettee, there must be a decline 
in loyalty to the state preceding a revolution for it to be successful. In the words of another 
author, revolution takes place when the majority of the citizens “feel cramped beyond tolerance” 
by economic institutions or the ideological situation (Odegard, 1939, p. 693). 
 
b. Second Generation 
The second generation of revolution research, 1940–1975, is characterized by its major 
theoretical frames of psychology, sociology, and political science. 
Paper 1: Conceptualizing Social Uprisings 
8 
Cognitive Psychology 
Based on cognitive psychology, Gurr (1970), Davies (1962), and Feierabend and Feierabend 
(1966) illustrate how frustration with a set of political or economic goals drives a revolution. 
However, the authors disagree on what exactly drives this frustration. Davies (1962) argues that 
short-term economic challenges cause relative deprivation in comparison to a reference group. 
Gurr (1970) agrees that deprivation plays a role, but he argues that it is relative deprivation based 
on one group’s comparison with another reference group, not individual deprivation. Taking a 
different view, Feierabend and Feierabend (1966) argue that a long period of modernization 
drives high expectations, which lead to frustration if they are not met. 
Sociological Structural Theories 
Sociological theories make up the second category of second-generation revolution theories. 
Smelser (1963) provides the foundation for a sociological theory of revolution by positing a 
theory on collective behavior based on a framework of social action including values, norms, 
mobilization, and situational facility. Smelser (1963) defines revolutions as violent non-
institutionalized movements that replace government. The drivers for such collective action “are 
the strains that give rise to hostile outburst” (Freeman, 1972, p. 342). Collective behavior is 
possible only when the opposition take responsible role and there is a high level of 
communication among the group members. 
Chalmers Johnson’s 1964 book Revolution and Social System is another contribution to 
sociological theories of revolution. Both Johnson and Smelser have a value-oriented 
understanding of revolution being a driver of social change. Moreover, both characterize 
revolution as violent. Johnson focuses his argument on the disequilibrium in society: a revolution 
is possible when there are two distinct groups, one of which tries to maintain the status quo while 
the other aims to alter the status quo (Zagorin, 1973). Whether this disequilibria will lead to a 
revolution depends on the characteristics of the group that wants to change the status quo 
(Freeman, 1972). “Accelerators” may push the disequilibria toward revolution. Accelerators 
include the regime’s loss of authority and the opposition’s access to arms. 
Political Science Theories 
Tilly (1975) and Huntington (1968) base their study of revolution on the “pluralist theory” of 
political science. They view revolutions as the “ultimate political conflict” (Goldstone, 1980, p. 
429). This conflict arises between competing interest groups, which then escalates to a point 
where it is no longer possible to mediate between the parties using standard political channels. 
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Huntington (1968) argues that modernization is the leading factor in revolutions. In a 
modernizing society, increasing levels of education and communication are accompanied by an 
increase in political demands. However, a traditional society taking its first steps toward 
modernization “lacks the political institutions and organizations capable of bearing the heavy 
new strains put on them” (Zagorin, 1973, p. 47). For Tilly, the key element for a revolution is the 
rise of new interest groups. Interest group conflict is the driver for revolution given these groups’ 
new and competing value systems and social orders. 
c. Third Generation 
Goldstone (1980) argues that the third-generation theorists provide the most comprehensive 
analysis of revolutions. Starting in 1975, theorists such as Paige (1975), Skocpol (1976), and 
Eisenstadt (1978) provided an analysis of revolution based on detailed historical accounts, which 
strengthens their arguments. 
Paige analyzes peasant revolutions. He argues that the type of revolution, for example, jacqueries 
or mass revolution, depends on the agrarian social structure. For example, mass peasant 
revolution is more likely when the landlord is dependent on the “income from land ownership” 
but the peasants earn their living from “migratory labor” (Goldstone, 1980, p. 437). This 
approach is criticized for analyzing rural conflicts in isolation. Khodarkovsky (1994) analyzes 
interaction among various societal groups during the fourteenth-century peasant revolutions of 
England and France, concluding that those revolutions involved more than only peasants. 
Eisenstadt (1978) does not believe that revolutions are driven by the material needs or desires of 
the revolutionaries. Instead, he shares Talcott Parsons’s ideology of value-driven actions 
(Sciortino, 2010). For Eisenstady, revolutions are defined as “social movements which bring 
about violent social change” (Madsen, 1979, p. 736). Eisenstadt ventures beyond the occurrence 
of revolution and analyzes post-revolutionary politics. He argues that revolutionary elites with 
close ties are “more likely to build an open post revolutionary politics, while isolated elites will 
tend to form coercive closed regimes” (Goldstone, 1980, p. 437). 
Skocpol (1976) argues that poor state structure and institutions can lead to revolution. For 
example, social revolutions increasingly occur in centralized bureaucratic agrarian societies 
peopled with powerful landlords. However, without human initiative and a loss of state 
legitimacy, revolution is not possible. Moreover, Skocpal argues that “international pressures” 
can be catalysts for revolutions (Goldstone, 1980, p. 440). In analyzing the outcomes of 
revolutions, Skocpol argues that they often end up with results different from those originally 
intended (Kamrava, 1999). 
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3. Characteristics of the Uprisings 
From the above review of theories of revolutions, it is apparent that theorists assume that 
revolutions are always violent, and indeed, the three definitions of revolution set out below make 
it very clear that violence is considered to be the key dimension (for a more comprehensive list 
of definitions of revolution, see Table A1 in the Appendix): 
 
A revolution changes the political and social system by violence. 
(Schaff, 1973) 
Revolutions incorporate fundamental change, violence, and class uprising. 
(Roper, 1994) 
Revolution is a form of violent political action used to change the regime. 
(Calvert, 1969) 
 
 
Despite the assumption that revolutions always involve violence, case studies and qualitative 
analyses illustrate that nonviolent uprisings are worth investigation, too. In fact, using the term 
“revolution” without further clarification does not indicate whether it is of a violent or 
nonviolent nature. Rule (1988) argues that the terms “civil violence” and “revolutions” are used 
synonymously. Thompson (2007) argues that the reason nonviolent uprisings have not been 
covered extensively is that they do not seem radical enough to many theorists. 
 
A. Violent 
The extant literature focuses on violent uprisings when analyzing events of government 
opposition and work on psychological and cognitive processes go some distance toward 
explaining why. Violence is viewed as a troublesome form of conflict and hence it attracts more 
attention (Elbert, Weierstall, and Schauer, 2010). In the 20th century “hundreds of millions of 
people” were killed due to political violence (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013).  
Much of the work on revolutions either ignores the possibility of there being other methods of 
opposition or views violent uprisings as the only effective means of achieving the desired 
outcome (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Kruegler and Parkman, 1985). Violent uprisings are 
argued to be more coercive and hence more likely to result in the desired policy change (Pape, 
1998). This reveals that violent revolt is understood by many as a means to the desired end of 
freedom. Worgs (2006) argues that a justification for using violence is to gain the respect of the 
oppressor. Political violence of opposition, including civil war and insurgency, is argued to be a 
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way of ousting an autocratic regime (Pevehouse, 2002). A review of extant literature highlight 
coups, revolutions, and assassinations as the commonly used methods of removing a dictator 
from power (Miller, 2012). 
Rebellion, guerilla warfare, and insurgencies are violent activities undertaken with the intent to 
weaken or overthrow the government (Carey, 2007). Groups taking these actions pose a 
substantial threat to the stability of a country and can trigger a violent response from the state 
(Davenport, 1995). According to Tosini (2007) insurgency movements use violence to promote 
its cause for the politically marginalized and repressed community.  
Violent uprising have a strong likelihood of leading to “two-sided violence between insurgent 
and the government” (Besley and Persson, 2011, p. 1411). Worgs (2006) justifies the use of 
violence in intrastate conflict in the case of having oppressive regime. Armed conflicts can 
provoke the government to respond with military force (Dudouet, 2013). There oppressed may 
need to take violent action to gain the respect of the oppressor. Insurgent organizations are 
argued by Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) to be justified in their use violence to provide protection 
to the targeted oppositions of civilian population by the state. Violence can be a form of 
retaliation for the loss of family and friends caused by the regime, thus creating a “cycle of 
violence” (Fielding and Shortland, 2010, p. 433). 
Power sharing arrangements imposed by external parties as a way of resolving a conflict has 
been found to increase insurgency violence instead of resulting in peace (Spears, 2000). Violence 
is seen by insurgency leaders as an “effective instrument to access state power” (Tull and 
Mehler, 2005, p. 394). 
Intrastate violence has been linked to relative deprivation of one societal group in comparison to 
a reference group (Caprioli, 2005; Besançon, 2005). Hence, economic inequality and political 
violence are strongly related. 
 
B. Nonviolent 
Conflict does not necessarily involve violence (Sharp, 1973). Indeed, it is arguable that there are 
both violent and nonviolent responses possible to any conflict (Most and Starr, 1989; McCarthy, 
1990), and this is true of conflicts between a government and the governed (Boulding, 1963), 
that is, there are both violent and nonviolent ways of handling these. 
In analyzing social uprisings, it is important to acknowledge that a routine political behavior may 
not always be a viable option for the opposition (Bond, 1988; Sharp, 1973). Routine political 
behavior such as voting, for example, can be very limited in autocracies (Tilly, 2007). Hence, in 
this sort of environment, it is likely that dissatisfied individuals will resort to some sort of direct 
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action, be it violent or nonviolent, where direct action is defined as when “individuals either do 
something not sanctioned by the authorities or refuse to do something they are expected or 
ordered to do” (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013, p. 389). Nonviolent action can be effective for a 
minority group that does not have resources and influence within a society (Zanden, 1963). 
Moreover, nonviolence is “less likely to bring direct retaliation” from the governing group 
(Wirmark, 1974, p. 128). 
Two books published in 2011—Why Violence Has Declined (Goldstein, 2011) and The Decline 
of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Pinker, 2011)—argue that the world is now experiencing less 
violence than in earlier centuries;. The books mention the increased number of peace and rights 
movements formed to voice the opinions and demands of minorities, ethnic groups, and women, 
among others. Books like these are good evidence that the extant literature’s focus on violent 
uprisings needs to be widened to accommodate a view of nonviolent uprisings. 
According to Lipsky (1976), there has been resistance against government for as long as there 
has been government, and not all of it has been violent. Shock (2013), for example, gives as an 
example of nonviolent civil resistance the plebeian secession of 449 BC, in which the Roman 
plebs left the city in a general strike and stayed out until the elite met their demands for political 
rights. Interestingly, Gene Sharp (1973), in discussing the power of civil disobedience, provided 
an explanation for the plebeian secession. Dr. Sharp
1
 (1993) explains that a mass of the 
population opposing the government over an extended period of time will eventually result in the 
regime dismantling the hierarchal system that allows it to function.  
Civil movements for change started occurring more regularly in the nineteenth century (Randle, 
1994; Bond, 1988). Indeed, public protests became an ever-more frequent response to unpopular 
government action (Carter, 2005). The twentieth century witnessed the collective nonviolence 
resistance of the working class in Italy in 1904, in Spain in 1919, and in Britain in 1926 (Shock, 
2013).  
 
C. The Choice and Consequences 
a. Choice 
The choice to use nonviolent means of opposition can be strategic/pragmatic or principled 
(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Principled nonviolence is based on religious or ethical 
ideology. Widely known examples of principled nonviolence are the movements led by Gandhi 
and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Childress, 1973). However, Gandhi’s notion of principled 
                                                           
1
 Dr. Gene Sharp is referenced in nearly every study of nonviolent movements. He founded the Albert 
Einstein Institution in 1983 to advance the study of nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the world. 
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nonviolence is not the norm (Ramana Murti, 1968); more often, nonviolent strategies are 
undertaken for pragmatic reasons, that is, for their effectiveness in achieving goals, not because 
of some religious ideology (Martin and Varney, 2003). Note that it is possible for nonviolent 
movements to coexist with violent action (Zunes, 1994). 
 
b. Consequences 
The literature has reached some consensus on the consequences of choosing violent or 
nonviolent means of opposition (Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Zunes, 2000). When violent 
means are chosen, the government may find it easier to justify its own use of force, stating, for 
example, that doing so is necessary to protect against security threats. Hence, “armed resistance 
often backfires by legitimating the state’s use of repressive tactics” (Zunes, 2000, p. 184). 
Choosing a nonviolent course of action, on the other hand, may put the regime under pressure 
and possibly lead to internal government division over the most suitable response. 
Nonviolent uprisings does not necessarily save the protestors from scrutiny. Opting for 
nonviolent opposition may take the government by surprise and could pose a risk of 
imprisonment, physical injury, and death (Gregg, 1969). Nonviolent opposition can include 
“tactics outside the normal political process, including strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations, 
contestation of public space, tax refusal, refusal to obey official orders (such as curfew 
restrictions)” (Zunes, 2000, p. 181). The success of nonviolent uprisings mostly depends on 
whether the people, as a mass, have more power than the government. 
Nonviolent civil movements attract the attention of international players, either donor countries 
or nongovernmental organizations, who in some cases can put additional pressure on the 
government to respond to its citizens’ demands (Jahn, 1973; Grant and Keohane, 2005). 
Binnendijk and Marovic (2006) argue that the international “repercussions” from a violent 
government reaction to a nonviolent movement are far more severe than any international 
response to violent insurgency. 
International human rights organizations encourage peaceful demonstrations of opposition and 
counsel against using violence (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011). Peace movement advocates argue 
that the effectiveness of nonviolence is underestimated and that taking such an approach saves 
lives and avoids armed conflicts (Weigert, 1989). Nonviolent movements can attract foreign aid 
(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).   
 
Paper 1: Conceptualizing Social Uprisings 
14 
4. Waves of Revolutions 
A discussion of social uprisings would be incomplete if it did not at least touch on one of their 
most unique aspects, which is the way they can spread across national borders. Indeed, looking 
at revolutions (or, as I prefer, social uprisings) worldwide, it appears that it is more likely than 
not that they occur in waves. 
Formal theories of revolutions are country or class specific; they might consider international 
forces as a form of external pressure, but they do not consider the influence of the revolution 
itself on neighboring countries or countries with the same ideologies. 
Waves of revolutions that spread across countries have been are analyzed in literature as 
empirical studies or case studies, but no formal theory has been formulated specifically for this 
phenomenon. On occasion, the “domino theory,” originally conceptualized by Eisenhower in the 
1950s to explain the spread of communism, is employed (Silverman, 1975). 
Indeed, the domino theory is used in a variety of disciplines to explain the spread of a certain 
phenomenon across different countries. For example, Silver (1974) uses the domino theory to 
explain the spread of successful revolutions in a foreign country. This view is supported by 
Slater (1987), in that he finds that successful revolutions spread faster because revolutions have a 
duplicating effect. A case study approach to studying the spread communist revolution has been 
applied to the case of Portugal (Oldberg, 1982). An empirical analysis of the spread of 
revolutionary movement have been conducted by Leeson and Dean (2009). Their empirical 
findings support the conceptual preposition of the spread of uprisings.  
The term “domino effect” is often used in news reporting about revolution,  the most recent 
example being that of the Arab Spring. A recent paper by Hale (2013) describes the spread of 
mass uprisings in the Arab world as the “dawning era of democracy and freedom,” which, 
according to the author, was due to the toppling of one dictator after another across national 
boundaries.  
Beissinger (2007) highlights the “transnational linkages” connecting revolutions, but he 
questioned the possibility of revolutionary spread beyond the post-communist regime. The 
events that took place in the Arab world in 2011 re-open this question and offer room for future 
research. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research 
This qualitative study provided a review of the literature on social uprisings, including how they 
are defined, theoretical arguments for their occurrence, their characteristics, and their peculiar 
habit of occurring in waves. A review of definitions made apparent that the term “revolution” is 
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ambiguous, having various connotations and uses. The term can be used to refer to a change after 
a certain event or mean the cycle of evolution leading to an event of regime change. Moreover, 
the term “revolution” is not confined to the study of politics; it can mean “astronomical” 
revolutions. 
Therefore, for a useful working definition, it is better to avoid the ambiguity inherent in the term 
“revolution” and instead use “social uprisings.” The reason for choosing this term is that it can 
focus the researcher’s attention on identifying the event itself in isolation from its causes or 
consequences. “Social uprisings” reflects the idea of an action taking place at a certain point of 
time. Social uprisings can be successful or unsuccessful.  
There is a consensus in the literature that social uprisings take place within national borders. 
How and why these uprisings travel in waves across borders is as yet undertheorized. 
Extant theory focuses on violent social uprisings; however, empirical and qualitative research 
reveals that nonviolent social uprisings are worth studying. 
The literature review undertaken in this paper demonstrates the appropriateness and practical 
usefulness of the definition of social uprisings provided by Hayo and Shaheen (2014): 
 
Social Uprisings are violent or nonviolent intra-state acts of defiance by groups 
of citizens against a country’s government. The definition of defiance covers 
demonstrations, revolutions, riots, revolts, strikes, and coups. Groups of citizens 
include political parties, organised groups, students, and workers, as well as the 
general public. 
 
This definition, along with the arguments presented by various theorists, provides a jumping off 
point for research into the causes and implications of social uprisings. The definition can be used 
as case specific in qualitative and empirical country-based approaches; it can be used in 
analyzing cross-country and worldwide samples. The concept of social uprisings with its two 
dimensions—violent and nonviolent—opens up new areas for empirical and qualitative analysis. 
For example, the definition can be applied to the case of the Arab Spring, which was a series of 
intrastate acts of defiance against government. 
The theories of revolution reviewed in this study are also of great importance to future growth of 
the field, two of which appear especially intriguing. First, the idea of relative deprivation as one 
of the major drivers of social uprisings. Second, the role played by international players, for 
example, donors and nongovernmental organizations, in social uprisings.  
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Extant Literature Definitions 
Author Term Definition 
Hayo and Shaheen  
(2014) 
Social 
Uprisings 
“Violent or nonviolent intra-state acts of defiance by 
groups of citizens against a country’s government. Our 
definition of defiance covers demonstrations, revolutions, 
riots, revolts, strikes, and coups. Groups of citizens 
include political parties, organised groups, students, and 
workers, as well as the general public. ” 
Waterman   
(1981, p. 555) 
Collective 
Political 
Activity 
“Is a joint action by large numbers of ‘ordinary’ people 
(that is, those not customarily engaged in political 
activity), expressly intended to affect the decisions of 
government, the structure or processes of government, or 
the selection of those who play significant roles in 
government. Incidents of collective political activity 
include rallies, demonstrations, political strikes, 
politically motivated acts of collective violence, collective 
acts of passive resistance to govern- mental actions, 
organized mass campaigns of letter writing, harassment, 
boycott, or electoral mobilization, and, of course, 
rebellion, revolution, and many cases of communal 
conflict. ” 
Jenkins and 
Schock (1992) 
Domestic 
Political 
Conflict 
Non-institutionalized coercive or threatening interactions 
between citizens and states. 
Tilly 
(1984) 
National 
Social 
Movement 
Sustained interactions between challengers and states. 
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Table A1 continued: Extant Literature Definitions 
 
Author Term Definition 
Marxist Revolution 
“As a product of irresistible historical forces, which 
culminate in a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat” (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967, p. 264). 
Arendt 
(1965) 
Revolutionary 
Experience 
“A kind of restoration, whereby the insurgents attempt 
to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as the 
result of the government's temporary lapse into 
despotism”  (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967, p. 264). 
Tocqueville 
(1955) 
Revolution 
“An overthrow of the legally constituted elite, which 
initiated a period of in-tense social, political, and 
economic change”  (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967, p. 
265). 
Brinton 
(1952) 
Coup d’État 
“A simple replacement of one elite by another” (Tanter 
and Midlarsky, 1967, p. 265). 
Brinton 
(1952) 
Major 
Revolutions 
“A replacement of one elite by another accompanied by 
social, political, and economic changes” (Tanter and 
Midlarsky, 1967, p. 265). 
Amann 
(1962, p. 38) 
Revolution 
“Revolution may be said to be a breakdown, momentary 
or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually 
accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience. ” 
Skocpol 
(1976) 
Social 
Revolution 
“Rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and 
class structures” that are “accompanied and in part 
carried through by class-based revolts from below” 
(Midlarsky and Roberts, 1985, p. 164) 
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Table A1 continued: Extant Literature Definitions  
Silver 
(1974, p. 64) 
Revolution 
“Is defined as a period in which the frequency of 
revolutionary acts is extraordinarily high 
A revolutionary act is an extra-legal act (violent or 
nonviolent) intended by the actor to secure a change in 
governmental personnel, structure, or policy.” 
Leites and Wolf 
(1970, p. 15) 
Insurgency 
“Defined as revolts not reaching the proportions of an 
organized revolution” 
Carey 
(2006, p. 2) 
Domestic 
Conflict 
“Is defined as any verbal or physical confrontation by 
domestic actors over political issues.” 
Chalmers Johnson 
(1964) 
Revolution 
“Is violence targeted to change the regime leadership, 
distribution of political power, or of social structure.” 
Kamrava 
(1999, p. 318) 
Revolution 
“An event that qualitatively changes the nature and 
composition of the state, the way it relates to and inter-
faces with society, and the larger political culture within 
which various types and levels of interaction between 
state and society take place.” 
Huntington 
(1968) 
Revolution 
“A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent 
domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a 
society, in its political institutions” (Kamrava, 1999, p. 
320).  
Dunn 
(1988, p. 12) 
Revolution 
“A form of massive, violent and rapid social change” 
(Kamrava, 1999, p. 320). 
Shugart 
(1989, p. 251) 
Social 
Revolution 
“The wholesale restructuring of class relations in society 
and of the class bases of state power.” 
  
Paper 1: Conceptualizing Social Uprisings 
29 
Table A2: Extant Literature Theories 
Author Theory Explanation 
Davies 
(1962) 
J curve 
“Revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged 
period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is 
followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the 
gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens 
and becomes intolerable. The frustration that develops … 
seeks outlets in violent action. When the frustration becomes 
focused on the government, the violence becomes coherent 
and directional. If the frustration is sufficiently widespread, 
intense, and focused on government, the violence will 
become a revolution.” 
(Gurr, 1973, p. 365). 
Gurr 
(1973, p. 373) 
Group conflict 
“That group conflict is pervasive in all societies at all times; 
it cannot be resolved, only-sometimes-regulated. He is more 
concerned with what he calls class conflict than Timasheff, 
and he considers class conflict a species of group conflict. 
Class conflict is defined as any conflict between the super-
ordinate and subordinate strata of authority structures. This is 
considerably different from and broader than Marx's 
definition of classes by reference to groups' relationship to 
the means of production.” 
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Table A2 Continued: Extant Literature Theories 
Chalmers 
Johnson 
Revolutionary 
conflict 
“The first necessary cause of revolutionary conflict is a 
disequilibrated social system, one in which either systems 
of values and ‘symbolic interpretations of social action,’ 
or the society's pattern of adaptation to the environment, 
change sufficiently that society's functional requirements 
can no longer be fulfilled. Elites faced with this situation 
may or may not attempt to redress the disequilibrium. If 
they prove intransigent or unable to do so, they lose 
legitimacy— the second necessary cause of revolution. 
They may still continue in power for some time by relying 
on coercion. The final, sufficient cause of revolution-
Johnson calls it an "accelerator"— is the elite's loss of 
control over the instruments of coercion. The military may 
be defeated in war, or become increasingly ambitious or 
disaffected from the rulers, or be challenged to 
revolutionary combat, but, however it happens, the 
accelerator precipitates revolutionary conflict” (Gurr, 
1973, p. 370). 
Smelser 
(1963) 
Theory of 
collective 
behavior 
“It is principally concerned with showing how various 
kinds of structural strain produce ‘collective behavior,” 
which is defined as ‘mobilization’ on the basis of a belief 
which redefines social action.’ More concretely, 
‘collective behavior’ includes panics, crazes, hostile 
outbursts (including riots), and norm- and value-oriented 
movements. Hostile outbursts and value-oriented 
movements comprise most violent conflicts-though note 
that Smelser is concerned with ac-counting for their non- 
or anti-system component, not with explaining conflict 
more generally” (Gurr, 1973, p. 368). 
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Table A2 Continued: Extant Literature Theories 
 
Rapopor 
(1971) 
The rational 
actor model 
“A player is neither benevolent nor malevolent vis-a-vis 
the other players. That is to say, he tries to maximize only 
his own payoff without regard for the payoffs of others, 
except to the extent that the projected payoffs of others 
give him information as to how others are likely to play. 
The rational player is thus neither gratified nor peeved by 
the winnings and losses of the other players”  (Lichbach, 
1989, p. 460). 
Muller 
(1985) 
Grievance 
deprived actor 
model 
“If the mobilization of discontent is correlated with the 
extensiveness of inequality, such that when inequality is 
pervasive some mobilization is almost bound to occur, 
then the relationship between inequality and political 
violence should be positive and curvilinear, i.e., positively 
accelerated” (Lichbach, 1989, p. 437). 
Gurr 
(1970) 
Grievance 
deprived actor 
model 
“The greater the scope and intensity of groups subject to 
economic discrimination, groups subject to political 
discrimination, and separatist groups in a nation, and the 
greater their size, cohesion, and coercive capacity, the 
greater the number of person-days lost from political 
violence in that nation” (Lichbach, 1989, p. 451). 
Tocqueville 
Revolution 
development 
“Resulted from a demand for accelerated social and 
economic progress in a society already gradually moving 
in these directions. In his mind, revolution was tied to 
increasing prosperity” (Lipsky, 1976, p. 498). 
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Measuring Social Acts of Defiance Against the Government: 
The Social Uprisings Composite Index (SUCI) 
 
Bernd Hayo and Sondos Shaheen 
Abstract 
This paper introduces the Social Uprisings Composite Index (SUCI), a new indicator 
for measuring acts of public defiance against the government. In contrast to various 
extant binary indicators of social unrest, SUCI is a multidimensional concept covering 
both violent and nonviolent social uprisings. The index is computed using factor 
analysis and available for an unbalanced panel of 200 countries over the period 1946 to 
2011. 
Keywords: Social uprising; revolution; civil war; conflict; movement; index; indicator 
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1. Introduction 
Social uprisings (SUs) against the government are important multidimensional 
phenomena. They not only affect the lives of individuals and social groups, but can 
change the course of nations. In their conceptually pure forms, they range across the 
spectrum from nonviolent protests to bloody civil wars, but in practice we usually find 
mixed forms, which make scientific classification difficult. Given their importance, 
theoretical concepts of SUs abound in various fields of social science research, 
particularly in psychology (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970), political science (e.g., 
Huntington, 1968; Tilly, 1975), and sociology (e.g., Sorokin, 1925; Skocpol, 1976). 
Despite this abundance of theoretical research, there are relatively few empirical studies on the 
topic. Arguably, this is at least partially due to limitations of the available empirical indicators 
for the theoretical concepts (Jenkis and Bond, 2001). Indeed, there are various problems in 
applying SU concepts to real-world data. First, in extant literature, internal conflict is primarily 
operationalised as a one-step binary dependent variable. Binary variables do not allow studying 
the level of, or change in, the intensity of SUs. Second, existing datasets are insufficient for 
testing many of the theoretical propositions (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Arguably, survey datasets 
with comprehensive worldwide coverage would appear to be helpful in empirically examining 
SU theories, as citizen participation decisions likely depend on subjective factors. (Gaventa, 
1982). However, survey data with worldwide coverage are limited and the available datasets, 
such as the World Value Survey and the Barometer Survey, neither cover each year or country 
comprehensively, nor are necessarily based on identical questionnaires or data-collection 
methodologies. Third, the quantitative empirical research that there is yields conflicting results 
and fails to adequately validate or reject proposed theories, which could be related to the use of 
binary indicators (Dixon, 2009). The conflicting results of empirical studies may also reflect the 
fact that extant theoretical approaches have various angles (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 
2004) which cannot be very well expressed with binary indicators. 
In the light of these deficiencies, it appears worthwhile to construct a new indicator 
designed to have the following advantages. First, the indicator is continuous and hence 
allows analysis of the progress and intensity of SUs. Second, the indicator is an 
operationalisation of a clearly defined theoretical concept of SUs. Third, that the 
indicator is constructed for 200 countries allows study of conflict in various regions of 
the world. Fourth, the indicator focuses on commonalities rather than differences 
between the various facets of SUs. In this paper, we propose just such an indicator for 
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social unrest, the Social Uprisings Composite Index (SUCI). It is constructed based on 
various subindicators using factor analysis and includes the four desirable elements 
listed above. This new indicator can be used in empirical analyses as either a dependent 
or an independent variable. SUCI helps resolve the ambiguity of terminology in extant 
literature in that it identifies social unrest by its traits and not by its causes or 
consequences. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual foundation of the 
composite index. Section 3 covers the methodology and construction of SUCI. The results of the 
factor analysis are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the final index and shows its 
development over time and regions. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Operationalising Theoretical Concepts of Social Uprisings 
This section briefly discusses problems with and ambiguities of the literature and provides the 
conceptual foundation for the construction of an empirically applicable definition of SUs. The 
comprehensive reviews by Shugart (1989), Goldstone (2001), Stone (1966), and Kamrava (1999) 
show a large number of theoretical studies on social defiance against the government. However, 
different theoretical studies often employ similar terms in alternative ways and use alternative 
terms for the same concepts. Typical concepts describing different facets of social defiance are 
‘revolution’, ‘civil war’, ‘internal conflict’, ‘movement’, ‘political uprising’, and ‘coups’. 
Typically, these theoretical studies have a conceptual focus and do not seriously consider 
empirical operationalisation. At the same time, a number of empirical indicators for SUs are 
proposed in the literature, but these often lack a clear theoretical framework. Moreover, the name 
of the variable and the actual contents of the variable are sometimes only loosely connected. For 
example, Belkin and Shofer (2003) construct an index for coup risk, where revolutions are 
treated the same way as coups. In the theoretical literature, however, these two concepts are 
considered to be very different. 
SUCI is designed for studying causes and consequences of SUs in the context of international 
comparisons. It is constructed as a broad indicator, although not every facet of SUs can be 
included. SUCI is based on finding commonalities between various subindicators of SUs, 
thereby resolving the ambiguity of relevant concepts and avoiding their arbitrary exclusion. A 
great deal of this ambiguity arises from the literature’s focus on studying only one specific facet 
of SUs. As the theoretical literature indicates, however, there is usually a clear-cut dividing line 
between separate facets of SUs. Blattman and Migue (2010, p. 6) argue that the ‘distinction 
between civil wars and other forms of political instability has largely been assumed rather than 
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demonstrated’. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that there is extensive empirical research 
allegedly concerned with studying civil wars, but the empirical choice of variables is actually 
based on theories of revolutions. Various theoretical angles make for a complicated terminology 
and have even been referred to as an ‘untidy set of observations’ (Kraminick, 1972, p. 26). Baev 
(2007, p. 247) calls this conceptual overlap the ‘Grey Zones of Intersection’ and points out that 
‘[c]ivil war … overlaps with several other type of violent crisis: inter-state wars, civil unrest and 
revolutions’. Starr goes as far as to question the theoretical premises used in this strand of 
research and labels the extant literature as ‘a-theoretical’ (1994, p. 482). Altogether, this 
ambiguous terminology and muddled operationalisation of theories is a challenge for empirical 
studies. 
SUCI reduces this ambiguity by focusing on the commonality of underlying facets rather than on 
artificial boundaries between theoretical concepts. Our review of the extant literature suggests 
that SUs can be classified according to their degree of violence. As pure forms, we can 
distinguish between violent and nonviolent conflict. For example, Tarrow (1995) acknowledges 
that revolutions possess characteristics also present in rebellions, riots, and protests. Waterman 
highlights the common properties of the terms ‘revolution, political strikes, turmoil, electoral 
mobilisation and demonstrations’ (1981, p. 554) and summaries them as actions of mass political 
movements. Bohlken (2010) argues similarly in the case of assassinations, rebellions, or 
insurgencies. 
Based on the above argument, we do not strictly separate SUs between those that are ‘violent’ 
and those that are ‘nonviolent’. And, indeed, the utility of this simple scheme was a topic of 
debate in the aftermath of Georgia’s 2003 uprising (Kandelaki, 2009). Although it is likely that 
one dimension dominates the other in a specific situation, this does not imply that a particular 
conflict has to be coded as a purely violent or nonviolent. SUCI allows simultaneously 
measuring violent and nonviolent aspects of a SU in two separate indicators. Separating SU into 
two indicators is supported by a number of qualitative studies. A review of extant literature, 
especially after the Arab Spring, shows an increasing emphasis on nonviolent movements 
(Zunes, 2011). Such movements are referred to as the ’nonviolent revolutionary times’ 
(Pearlman, 2012). For example, Arab Spring movements are now being compared to earlier 
nonviolent movements, such as Indonesia in the 1990s, Philippines in the 1980s, India in the 
1940s, and civil rights movements in the US in the 1960s as well as major nonviolent 
protagonists, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. (Batstone, 2014; and 
Hoynes, 2014). Compared to violent movements, nonviolent movements were previously 
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neglected due to two main reasons: first, the view of nonviolent movements as rather passive 
social protest without much momentum for fostering change and, second, that violent uprisings 
lead to more important international repercussions (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013). 
However, an alternative reading of the literature rejects the view of passive nonviolent 
movements. There are a number of successful examples showing the ability of such movements 
to overturn long-standing dictatorships without resorting to violence (Nepstad, 2011; Thomas 
and Louis, 2013; Vander Zanden, 1963). Since SUCI measures both nonviolent and nonviolent 
SU, it makes it possible to study the respective influence of each type of social movement 
without having to rely on questionable a priori assumptions. 
Another advantage of SUCI is that it can identify a situation as a SU without reference to causes 
and consequences. SUCI is explicitly constructed to capture social defiance against the 
government, which distinguishes it from a recent strand of literature focussing on 
fractionalisation and conflict (Esteban and Schneider, 2008; and Esteban and Ray, 2011). The 
fractionalisation literature is mainly interested in studying cleavages and eruption of violence 
between polarised groups within a country's borders, but does not specifically look at social 
actions against the government (Koubi and Boehmelt, 2014; Basedau and Pierskalla, 2014). 
Inasmuch as the government is included in the analysis, it is from the perspective of an authority 
providing a so-called ‘peace-buying’ mechanism (Wagenast and Basedau, 2012). Put differently, 
the government uses various methods to repress violence arising from fractionalisation, which of 
course may cause counteractions by social groups. In the construction of SUCI fractionalisation, 
or any other factor, does not play a specific role. Quite the reverse, as SUCI is an index that can 
be used in empirical studies on the causes of SU.  
However, not all theoretical studies clearly separate between cause and effect when deriving a 
definition for SU. For example, de Tocqueville (1955) includes a possible consequence of a 
revolution in his definition of a revolution, which is the ‘overthrow of a legally constituted elite’. 
Another example is Arendt’s (1958) definition of revolution as a restoration of liberties that were 
lost. So the outcome of a revolution, namely, regaining lost liberties, is part of the definition of 
the process itself. In constructing an empirical indicator, theories that define the actual event are 
easier to operationalise. Such theories include, for example, Gurr’s (1970) definition of political 
movements as collective attacks within political community against the political regime. Another 
example is Goldestone’s (2001) definition of a revolution as an effort to achieve political change 
through actions such as mass demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence. 
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The OECD (2008) stresses the importance of an appropriate theoretical framework in deriving a 
useful composite index. Reflecting these considerations, we define SUs as violent or nonviolent 
intra-state acts of defiance by groups of citizens against a country’s government. Our definition 
of defiance covers demonstrations, revolutions, riots, revolts, strikes, and coups. Groups of 
citizens include political parties, organised groups, students, and workers, as well as the general 
public. This definition is the starting point for constructing SUCI as a composite empirical 
indicator. 
Although we cannot avoid generalisations in the construction of an index covering a large group 
of countries over long periods of time, we want to emphasise one drawback of and one caveat 
about SUCI. The drawback is that specific subdimensions of SUs cannot be studied in isolation. 
The caveat is that the index headers can be misleading if not carefully interpreted. For example, 
a positive value of the nonviolent index does not imply that there were no violent actions. In 
creating SUCI, we followed John Elster’s advice that it is preferable to have an indicator that is 
both broad and flexible (Center for the Study of Civil War, 2003). 
A review of extant empirical studies shows that the variables most commonly employed for 
capturing social unrest are the number of deaths and the onset of social unrest (Parvin, 1973; 
Besançon, 2005; Jakobsen et al., 2013). Both variables have severe limitations as general 
indicators of SUs. The number of deaths (see, e.g., Parvin, 1973; Besançon, 2005), is 
conceptually problematic. As Sambanis (2004) emphasises, it is not clear when exactly the count 
should start, that is, when does an old war end and a new one start? Another problem is that the 
variable counting the number of deaths includes all sorts of conflicts as long as they incur deaths. 
Although number of deaths is a continuous variable that can be used to capture the escalation of 
SU intensity, it arguably measures a consequence of the conflict rather than the occurrence of the 
actual event. Moreover, using the number of deaths fails to discriminate between different types 
of SUs. 
Indicators based on the onset of social unrest often are specified as step dummies over the course 
of the conflict (Jakobsen et al., 2013). This implies that they cannot capture variation in the 
intensity of a conflict over time. Moreover, such dummy variables measure only the occurrence 
of unrest in a certain year and do not distinguish between degrees of violence (Garrison, 2008). 
For example, onset indicators do not easily allow studying violent and nonviolent aspects of 
SUs. Another problem of onset variables is identified by Hendrix (2010), who argues, in the case 
of Cuba, that the often employed battle death dataset provided by the Peace Research Institute 
Oslo (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005) does not consider insurgency movements occurring years 
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before the coded onset. In terms of modelling outcomes, the use of onset indicators can generate 
statistically significant results, but the underlying models have poor predictive power (Ward et 
al., 2010). 
3. Deriving a New Indicator of SUs: SUCI 
Technically, our composite index, SUCI, is based on factor analysis, which allows 
capturing similarities in various facets of SUs. Composite indicators are popular due to 
their ability to summarise complex relationships as numbers (Zhou and Ang, 2007). 
Moreover, since factor analysis generates variables with a metric scale, SUCI captures 
both the occurrence as well as the intensity of conflicts over time. Finally, the indicator 
can be employed for single-country analyses as well as for cross-country analyses. 
Combining these two dimensions allows using SUCI in panel-data models. 
As a composite indicator, SUCI is based on aggregating various subindicators for 
measuring SUs, which typically do not have the same units of measurement. Thus, 
composite indicators help quantify complex terms with the assistance of various types 
of subindicators. According to Zhou and Ang (2007), the construction of composite 
indicators depends on two key elements: the choice of the underlying subcomponents 
and the weighing methods used for aggregation. The choice of the underlying variables 
should be guided by theory, but it is frequently the case that data limitations lead to an 
overreliance on rough proxies rather than precisely specified variables. Aggregation of 
noisy subcomponents generally leads to a better indicator than using one of the 
individual subindicators on its own. 
The second key element in the construction of composite indicators is an appropriate 
weighing method. Index weighing methods include data envelopment techniques, 
principal components, factor analysis, equal weighing, simple average, and panel of 
experts (Cevik et al., 2012). Which of these is the ‘best’ weighing method is subject to 
debate and there is some reason to suspect that a certain degree of subjectivity in the 
weight assignment is unavoidable (Chyrche et al., 2008). 
In our view, factor analysis, one of the most widely used methods of multivariate data 
reduction, is one of the least subjective methods of building a composite index. The 
weights are derived from the actual dataset by extracting the common variance of 
subcomponents, which is assumed to reflect the desired theoretical concept in the form 
of an underlying latent variable. One source of subjectivity in factor analysis is the 
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choice of subcomponents. In the context of constructing a composite index, factor 
analysis is used to derive weights for the index’s subcomponents. This procedure 
allows creating one or more new variables, called factors, which account for the shared 
variances between the subindicators and reflect the underlying latent variable(s) 
corresponding to the theoretical concept(s). 
A closely related statistical alternative to factor analysis is principal component 
analysis (PCA). However, Fabrigar et al. (1999) recommend using factor analysis 
when there is some theoretical basis for relationships between variables, whereas PCA 
should be used if the goal is to explore patterns in their data. Moreover, they the 
authors make a number of arguments for why factor analysis is the preferred method in 
theoretically guided research. Finally, factor analysis takes into account random errors 
in measurement of the subcomponents, whereas PCA does not.
1
 
As a rule of thumb for statistically valid application of factor analysis, the OECD 
(2008) suggests a minimum of 30 cases per country, which is always met in our 
dataset. Factor analysis does not allow for missing data and outliers can affect the 
results. The dataset used in constructing SUCI has no missing values. To guarantee 
this, as well as meet the 30-minimum-cases requirement, the dataset is constructed as 
an unbalanced panel covering the period 1946 to 2011. The starting date for a country 
depends on the year the country was founded and data availability. 
SUCI reflects the fact that SU is a multidimensional concept covering both violent and 
nonviolent acts of defiance against the government. As discussed in Section 2, SUCI 
encompasses various terminologies, such as demonstration, riot, strike, guerrilla 
warfare, and revolution, the boundaries of which are rather blurred. SUCI overcomes 
this ambiguity by utilising the factor loading of subcomponents on two main aspects of 
defiance, violent and nonviolent. The remainder of this section follows Booysen’s 
(2002) sequence of composite index development: data selection, scaling, and 
weighing. 
A. Data Selection 
First, the underlying variables have to be chosen based on a theoretical and empirical 
foundation (Stock and Watson, 1989; Tata and Schultz, 1988). Following the 
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To check the robustness of our choice, an alternative composite indicator is constructed using PCA with the same 
variables. The correlation coefficients between the SUCI and the PCA indicator are 0.7 for the nonviolent index and 
0.7 for the violent index. Thus, results are generally similar. 
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discussion above, SUCI is designed to capture the act of defiance, without regard to the 
causes and/or consequences of such an action. An extra advantage of such a strict 
definition is that the final index will be able to be used as both a dependent and an 
independent variable. 
We collect suitable subindicators from three different databases. The Cross-National 
Time-Series (CNTS) is a quantitative dataset that covers commonly used terms for 
internal conflict, including demonstration, riot, strike, revolution, and guerrilla warfare. 
The subindicators ‘magnitude’ and ‘intensity’ are taken from datasets provided by the 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), 
respectively. These seven variables are the subcomponents underlying the factor 
analysis used for constructing SUCI. Table 1 contains descriptions of how these 
concepts are operationalised in the respective databases. 
The dataset contains nearly 10,000 observations and includes historic nation building 
and destruction as well as many small and forgotten disputes. The list of countries 
exceeds the 193 nations recognised by the United Nations in 2013, due to separations 
of states, creation of new states, and cessation of states (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Table 1: Definitions of SUCI’s Subcomponents 
Variable Definition Source 
Demonstration 
Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the 
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition 
to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature 
CNTS 
Riot 
Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 
citizens involving in the use of physical force 
Strike 
Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers 
that involves more than one employer aiming at national 
government policies or authority 
Guerrilla Warfare 
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces aiming at 
the overthrow of the present regime. 
Revolution 
Any illegal or forced change in the top govern-mental elite, 
any attempt at such a change, or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence 
from the central government. 
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 Table 1 continued: Definitions of SUCI’s Subcomponents  
Intensity 
The intensity variable is coded in two categories 
1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a 
given year.  
2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year  
PRIO 
Magnitude Scaled number of rebel combatants or activists (range 0–4) PITF 
 
The correlations between the subcomponents used for SUCI construction are given in 
Table 2. The inclusion of weakly correlated subcomponents is supported by the 
multicriteria decision-making adjustment proposed by Hill and Tzamir (1972) and 
Delft and Nijkamp (1976), which improves the ability of the factor analysis to consider 
theoretically valuable variables in the final index. Two statistical tests for the 
appropriateness of conducting a factor analysis are run: Bartlett’s test of sphericity, 
testing whether the correlation is an identity matrix, and the Kaiser/Meyer/Olking test 
of sampling adequacy (KMO), which compares the magnitudes of the correlation 
coefficients in Table 2 with the partial correlation coefficients, i.e., after removing the 
linear influence of all other subcomponents. Bartlett’s test is significant at a 5% level, 
suggesting that there is a sufficient degree of correlation of the underlying indicators 
with the predicted factor. The KMO test returns a value of 0.65, which implies 
adequacy of the dataset at a 5% level of significance. 
Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients Between Subcomponents of SUs 
 
 
Demon-
stration Strike Riot 
Guerrilla 
Warfare Revolution Intensity 
Demonstration 1 
     
Strike 0.29 1 
    
Riot 0.60 0.31 1 
   
Guerrilla Warfare 0.08 0.14 0.14 1 
  
Revolution 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.29 1 
 
Intensity 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.31 
 
Magnitude 0.07 0.044 0.07 0.27 0.28 0.28 
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Thus, both tests support the use of the selected subcomponents as a base for conducting factor 
analysis. To improve interpretability of the resulting factor estimates, we apply a varimax 
rotation.
2
 
B. Data Scaling 
As factor analysis does not allow for missing data, we restrict our attention to the time 
period from 1946 to 2011. Moreover, there are data availability issues and changes in 
the underlying group of countries, which make the panel data set unbalanced. 
Summary statistics for the variables used in SUCI construction are provided in Table 3. 
Higher values of the subcomponents reflect a more intense act of defiance against the 
government, irrespective of degree of violence. 
The original datasets for magnitude and intensity of internal conflicts are amended to 
include periods of no conflict by adding zero for such years. Years of ‘non-action’ are 
taken from Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) (Banks and Wilson, 
2013). Before aggregation, all subcomponents are standardised by subtracting their 
means and dividing by their standard deviations (Cevik et al., 2012). 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Subcomponents 
 
Non Standardised Values Standardised Values 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Min Max 
Demonstration 0.49 2.06 0 74 –0.24 35.77 
Strike 0.11 0.49 0 13 –0.22 26.49 
Riot 0.40 1.66 0 55 –0.24 32.81 
Guerrilla Warfare 0.17 0.71 0 34 –0.24 47.54 
Revolution 0.16 0.48 0 9 –0.34 18.41 
Intensity 0.12 0.38 0 2 –0.90 4.92 
Magnitude 0.17 0.79 0 9 –0.22 11.24 
 
C. Data Weighing 
We follow the OECD (2008) factor analysis methodology for aggregating the subcomponents. It 
is presumed that each subcomponent captures one specific aspect of SU and that they jointly 
                                                           
2 Applying oblique rotation generates very similar results, both with respect to the factor loadings as well as the 
final index values. Using regional data, varimax and oblique-based rotations yield correlation coefficients for violent 
and nonviolent indices of 0.98 and 0.99, respectively. 
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reflect the level of unrest in a country. The weights of individual subcomponents in the 
composite SU index are based on their factor loadings, i.e., the correlation of individual 
subindicators with the newly constructed factor(s). Thus, variable weights reflecting the 
underlying structure of the data are obtained, rather than being based on the researcher’s a priori 
judgments. Based on the factor loadings, factor scores are derived for each country and each 
available year covered by the subcomponents. Standardising these scores results in SUCI. 
The specific sample used in factor analysis is of great importance. In principle, possibilities 
range from computing specific factor scores based on the observations for each country to 
computing general factor scores based on the full worldwide sample. The advantage of the 
former is that country-specific weighing controls for idiosyncratic structures in SUs in each state. 
The disadvantage is that country-based factor analysis is not feasible for those subcomponents 
that do not vary at a country level. 
In the face of this trade-off, we compromise. We provide two versions of SUCI, one based on a 
world sample, the other based on dividing the dataset into geographic regions when estimating 
the factor scores. Although non-variation is an issue for some of the regions, too, e.g., there are 
no revolutions in North America during our sample period, dropping theoretically relevant 
subcomponents on a broad scale likely leads to inconsistent factor loadings and difficulties of 
interpretation. 
Given the identical weighing scheme, the world sample SUCI is advantageous if the goal is to 
compare the absolute degree of SUs across countries. This version of SUCI allows comparing 
the severity of a SU in one country with that in another country or across time. 
However, sometimes the research focus is on comparing the relative degree of SUs, i.e., whether 
a period of time is characterised by a relatively greater degree of unrest in a country compared to 
other periods, even though the severity of SU might not be high in absolute terms compared to 
other countries. Relative effects can be relevant for explaining social processes, e.g., the political 
consequences of social protest in a country where this happens very rarely are likely much 
greater than in a country where social protest is a regular occurrence. 
Another advantage of regionally grouping a worldwide sample is that geographic proximity is 
accompanied by similarity in culture and political systems, which leads to similar types of SUs. 
Two good examples of this are the fall of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the 
Arab Spring social uprisings in the MENA region in 2011. We choose 11 regional subsamples 
on which to conduct factor analysis: Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), former 
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USSR and Yugoslavia, Eastern Bloc, South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, 
Oceania, Latin America, and North America. The countries included in each region are listed in 
Table A2 in the Appendix. 
4. Results of Factor Analyses 
After conducting factor analyses based on different samples, as described above, it turns out that 
the worldwide sample SUCI is highly correlated with SUCI based on regional samples. 
However, there are notable differences between the two versions in terms of ranking the severity 
of violent and nonviolent conflicts, thus emphasising the difference between an absolute and a 
relative interpretation of the index. 
A. SUCI World 
Using the worldwide sample, the factor analysis results in three factors being retained. Only two 
of the three have acceptable Eigen values and factor loadings; the third factor always has an 
Eigen value lower than 0.02 and factor loadings lower than 0.01. As is apparent from Figure A1 
in the Appendix, exclusion of the third factor is also supported by considering the breakpoint in 
scree plots (Osborne and Costello, 2005). In light of the theoretical distinction between violent 
and nonviolent conflicts, we re-estimate the factor imposing the restriction of only two factors. 
Implementing a valid restriction improves estimation efficiency, provides a better separation of 
the two factors as expressed in higher factor loadings, and, and least in our case, facilitates 
interpretation. Table 4 gives the outcome of the factor analysis. 
Table 4: Factor Analysis Based on World Dataset 
Factor Nonviolent Violent 
Eigen Values 1.2 1.0 
Explained Variance 77 65 
Factor Loadings After Varimax Rotation 
Demonstration 0.68 0.04 
Riot 0.70 0.07 
General Strike 0.42 0.09 
Guerrilla Warfare 0.16 0.45 
Revolution 0.09 0.52 
Magnitude 0.05 0.50 
Intensity 0.03 0.50 
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In general, there is a clear division between variables based on their loadings into two factors. 
Demonstration, Strike, and Riot load onto Factor 1; Guerrilla Warfare, Revolution, Intensity, and 
Magnitude load onto Factor 2. Factor 1 can be interpreted as capturing an underlying latent 
variable ‘nonviolent SU’ and Factor 2 as capturing ‘violent SU’. Thus, these factor loadings 
support dividing social uprisings into violent and nonviolent. Of course, a riot may also contain 
violent elements, but compared to the subindicators loading highly on the second factor, these 
tend to be quite limited. 
As noted above, the greatest subjective element in a factor analysis is selection of specific 
subcomponents. Nonetheless, for what we believe are relatively less subjective reasons, we 
refrain from including two indicators sometimes found in the literature from SUCI (Bohlken, 
2010; Sambanis, 2004). The first excluded subindicator reflects the number of coups. In our 
case, the omission is due to statistical as well as conceptual reasons. Conceptually, Belkin and 
Shofer (2003) argue that coups do not require widespread public support. Statistically, including 
coups in the factor analysis substantially lowers the Eigen values and this subindicator cannot 
clearly be allocated to the violent or nonviolent category of SUs. In practice, our indicator is not 
sensitive with respect to considering the number of coups: the correlation coefficients between 
indices including and excluding this variable are 0.99 for the nonviolent SUCI and for 0.98 for 
the violent SUCI. 
Another variable that could be included in the factor analysis is intensity per capita of conflict, 
which is measured on a scale from 0 to 2. To account for population differences, a 
subcomponent is constructed as intensity per capita based on the absolute number of deaths and 
population size. It loads negatively on the factor reflecting the nonviolent dimension and 
positively on the one reflecting the violent dimension. However, the factor loading was lower 
than the rule of thumb cut-off range of 0.3, whereas the conceptually similar intensity range has 
a loading of almost 0.5. Again, using this variable does not lead to noteworthy differences in the 
constructed indicator. Thus, SUCI appears robust to changes in the underlying subindicators. 
B. SUCI Regional 
The factor analysis for each of the 11 regions is implemented in the same way and also results in 
three factors retained. The regional scree plots in Figure A1 show that exclusion of the third 
factor is justified. Table A3 provides the Eigen values and factors estimated for the 11 regions. 
Although all the factors chosen for each region are before the breakpoint of the scree plot, not all 
have an Eigen value larger than 1. To obtain a comprehensive index, we also include regions for 
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which the Eigen value is less than 1, which is particularly the case for regions rarely 
experiencing violent protests, e.g., North America. 
The factor loadings support the division of SUs into violent and nonviolent. However, due to a 
lack of observations, Western Europe, Oceania, and North America have low loadings on the 
violent factor. Nevertheless, we retain these factors in SUCI based on theoretical background, 
scree plot results, and comprehensiveness of index. The correlation coefficients between the 
world-based and the region-based indicator are 0.9 for the nonviolent index and 0.8 for the 
violent index. 
5. Describing Social Unrest Across Regions and Time 
This section provides descriptive statistics and shows the relevance of SUCI by linking its 
specific values to real-world events and discussing regional particularities. Covering each of the 
200 countries in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. Sample information on SUCI national 
data is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
A. SUCI World 
SUCI World provides annual values for violent and nonviolent uprisings using a worldwide 
average. It is constructed by computing the arithmetic mean of standardised country scores per 
year from 1946 to 2011. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of SUCI World and provides 
stylised facts about worldwide SU over time. In our sample period, there is no obvious trend, 
either in nonviolent or violent uprisings. However, the two series appear to be positively related; 
the correlation coefficient is 0.5. The figure shows that the peak years of violent and nonviolent 
uprisings are 1970 and 2011, respectively. The strong hike in nonviolent SUs is due to the events 
in the MENA region, the second strongest hike is also associated with 1970. 
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Figure 1: SUCI World 
 
Looking at violent SUs, the peak in 1970 is strongly influenced by events in Jordan, Cambodia, 
Guatemala, Vietnam, and Chad.
3
 There is no visible regional clustering in this year, as these 
countries are from different regions: MENA, Southeast Asia, Latin America, South Asia, and 
Africa, respectively. However, they were not the sole drivers of the index that year. Table 5 
shows the share of countries with violent SUs and the intensity quartiles of this index at two 
points in time, 1970 and 1989. 
For 1970, we find that about 40% of the countries were in the fourth quartile, i.e., the highest 
intensity level, and only less than 1% of all countries had no violent SUs. Comparing the two 
peaks in the violent index value in 1970 and 1989, i.e., after the phase of violence in the 1940s, 
provides further insight into the variation in the level of SUs. We find that in 1989, more than 
twice as many countries had no SUs and only about one-quarter of the countries are found in the 
fourth quartile. 
Table 5: Quartile Percentages of Violent Social Uprisings Based on SUCI World 
Social Uprising Year No Violent SU (in %) Quartiles (in %) 
  
 1 2 3 4 
Violent 
1989 2.3 17 31 24 27 
1970 0.7 13 30 16 40 
To get an impression of the reliability and practical relevance of SUCI, we list the top five 
countries showing the maximum standardised index values since 1946 in Table 6. Starting with 
the nonviolent SUCI in Panel A, the ranking is dominated by events in the United States in the 
1960s. A review of extant literature shows that these uprisings, referred to as the ‘Race Riots’, 
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 A qualitative review of events in the five countries supports the index’s findings (available on request). 
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are extensively studied in various fields of research covering political science, sociology, and 
economics (Adams, 1972; Graham, 1980; Myers, 1997; Wilkinson, 2009). The three years 
shown in Table 6 highlight the most intense episodes of civil movements in Detroit, Chicago, 
and Cambridge, respectively. However, generally, the civil movements were geographically 
dispersed, with their common characteristic being ‘major poverty concentration within large 
metropolitan areas’ (Chikota, 1970, p. 155). Finally, two of the top five nonviolent SUs are in 
2011 and involve the MENA region’s ‘Arab Spring’ movement. These events capture mass 
protests in Syria and Yemen that later led to violent SUs. 
Table 6: Top Social Uprising Incidents Based on SUCI (World Dataset) 
 
A. Non-violent SUCI B. Violent SUCI 
Rank Country Year Country Year 
1 United States 1967 Cambodia 1970 
2 United States 1968 Brazil 1969 
3 Syria 2011 Pakistan 1971 
4 Yemen Republic 2011 Jordan 1970 
5 United States 1963 Colombia 2004 
 
The list of particularly violent SUs is led by events in Cambodia in 1970. As DeRouen and Uk 
(2007, p. 220) put it, ‘the communist revolutionary movement initially spread in the form of 
protests or regional rebellions. However, the civil war entered a new phase that involved 
ordinary combat and guerrilla warfare’. In 1971, it is Bangladesh’s liberation war, leading to its 
independence from Pakistan in the following year (Lyon, 2008), that causes a high SUCI value. 
The secession of East Pakistan can be traced back to a highly polarised election result in 
December 1970 (Sisson and Rose, 1991; Diener, 2010), which resulted in a nine-month-long 
uprising characterised by ‘violence, militant rebellion, and urban terrorism’ (Bose, 2005, p. 
4463). Brazil experienced insurgency movements in the 1960s that attempted to overthrow the 
military dictatorship. The event in 1969 was fuelled by the activities of the Brazilian communist 
guerrilla movement ‘National Liberation Action’ (Asprey, 2002). Jordan is listed in 1970 due to 
what is now referred to as ‘Black September’. The incident resulted in thousands of deaths 
following a failed attempt to oust the king (Hussein, 2000). The high violent SUCI value in 
Colombia in 2004 reflects the ‘Minga protest’, which resulted in armed conflicts between the 
indigenous population and the government (Murilloa, 2009). The Uribe Vélez’s government 
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actions were questioned by national and international human rights and victims’ organisations 
(Gleghorn, 2013). 
B. SUCI Regional 
Table 7 gives the country ranking based on the regional index. As it now includes Egypt in 
addition to Syria and Yemen, the nonviolent SUCI is even more dominated by the ‘Arab Spring’ 
movements in the MENA region. Reflecting the anti-apartheid demonstrations in 1985 (Kadalie, 
1995), South Africa ranks highest in SUCI’s nonviolent category. Argentine workers and 
students staged mass riots in May and June 1969. These nonviolent movements, labelled the 
‘Cordobazo’ in Argentina, led to a change in government (Turner and Miguens, 1983). 
Table 7: Top Social Uprising Incidents Based on SUCI 
 
A. Non-violent SUCI B. Violent SUCI 
Rank Country Year Country Year 
1 South Africa 1985 Jordan 1970 
2 Syria 2011 Tajikistan 1992 
3 Argentina 1969 Italy 1947 
4 Yemen Republic 2011 France 1962 
5 Egypt 2011 Cambodia 1970 
 
SUCI’s violent category is topped by Jordan’s ‘Black September’. Another example of a very 
violent uprising occurred after Tajikistan’s presidential elections in May 1992, when violent riots 
erupted, which escalated into an armed confrontation in Dushanbe (Mikaberidze, 2011). Perhaps 
surprisingly, Table 7 also contains two European countries, Italy and France. This illustrates the 
importance of differentiating between the absolute and relative severity of SUs. Although the 
European countries do not show an absolutely high level of violent SUs when compared with the 
world sample, for Europe as a region, these were extraordinarily violent SUs. The Italian 
government faced major riots and other violent events in 1947 following demand for economic 
reform by the public and particularly by the communists (Ginsborg, 2003). Leading up to the 
Evian Accord in 1962, which ended the Algerian War, there was internal violence in France, 
consisting of terrorist attacks by the Algerian Secret Army and violent protests by the French 
public (Baron, 2013). 
An average regional SUCI is computed for each of the 11 regions used in the factor analysis. As 
each of the 11 regions has a specific history, the regional index enables us to derive stylised facts 
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about regional SU as well as study aspects of SUs that that are not easily visible in SUCI World, 
e.g., the spillover of SU from one country to its regional neighbours. To economise on space, we 
illustrate the appropriateness of using a regional mean rather than a world mean with a few 
examples. 
Figure 2 shows violent and nonviolent SUCI for Africa. Note that valid interpretation of the 
figure requires careful attention to the underlying data.  
Figure 2: SUCI Africa (Mean) (1946–2011) 
 
This is particularly important for understanding the peak in the nonviolent episodes before 1960. 
Do to colonisation, SUCI Africa before 1960 is based on only three countries: Ethiopia, Liberia, 
and South Africa. Moreover, it can be shown that the nonviolent uprisings over the period from 
1946 to 1960 are driven by events in South Africa. 
From the 1960s onward, known as the decade of African independence (Zack, 2012), SUCI 
covers many more countries. Figure 3 gives a detailed representation of data availability and 
decolonisation dates. Looking at the period from the 1970s onward, there are three waves of 
violent uprisings in each decade and a relative drop in the 2000s. The 1990s reflect the third 
wave of democratisation. The highest nonviolent peak in 1991 is due to protests against 
incumbent governments (Walle, 2001). Democratisation moved from protest to intense struggle 
over basic political rules. This also explains why nonviolent uprisings coexisted with violent 
uprisings in the 1990s. The nonviolent SU value in 1985 is primarily driven by South Africa and 
the struggle to abolish apartheid. The peak of nonviolent SUs in 1991 is due to events in several 
African countries, particularly Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, and Madagascar. There are relatively few 
violent SUs in Africa in the 2000s, but nonviolent SUs can still be found. This may have to do 
with the behaviour of opposition parties in many African parties (Barkan, 2009). 
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Figure 3: SUCI Africa (Mean) (1960–2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more recent episode of nation creation after a significant rise in SU levels is the fall of the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Figure 4 shows that the Eastern Bloc 
witnessed several nonviolent SUs that peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Figure 4: SUCI Former Eastern Bloc (Mean) 
 
 
Countries emerging out of the former USSR and Yugoslavia show a similar surge in nonviolent 
SUs starting in the mid-1980s and finishing in 1992 (see Figure 5). These protests were an 
important factor in the fall of the ‘iron curtain’. 
Figure 5: SUCI Former USSR and Yugoslavia (Mean) 
 
Figure 6 shows the development in the MENA region, which is dominated by the unprecedented 
rise in nonviolent SUs in 2011. 
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Figure 6: SUCI MENA (Mean) 
 
 
However, 2011 also witnessed an increase in SU levels in several regions, including Europe, 
Latin America, and South and East Asia. The index measuring violent SUs does not show 
notable changes in the most recent period but, given the violent development in 2012 and 2013, 
we can expect to see a substantial increase after a data update. In our sample period, as noted 
above, the peak in violent SUs occurred in 1970. 
Oceania is another interesting example of how background knowledge is necessary to 
appropriate interpretation of SUCI. This region consists of relatively small countries scattered 
across the Pacific Ocean, which creates substantial intra-regional heterogeneity. The peaks 
shown in SUCI Oceania’s mean in Figure 7 are driven by specific developments in one particular 
country at a time rather than region-wide SUs. Moreover, the addition of new countries is not 
necessarily due to conflict resolution or nation creation. For example, in the case of Fiji, ‘the 
Fijians themselves made no push for independence and [the independence] came as a surprise to 
most people’ (Campbell, 1989, p. 199). The change in Tonga was ‘imperceptible’ as technically 
it has never lost its independence since 1905 (Campbell, 1989). Regarding violent SUs, it is 
worth mentioning that the subindicator magnitude is dropped from Oceania due to non-
availability, which helps explain its low volatility before the mid-1980s. 
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Figure 7: SUCI Oceania (Mean) 
 
Latin America’s SUCI is shown in Figure 8, where we find a cycle of violent uprisings in the 
1970s and 1980s due to extensive guerrilla warfare and stringent military dictatorships (Imbusch 
et al., 2011). This cycle peaked in 1970 and 1989, and in both years it was not a single country 
that drove the indicator, but a widespread state of violent SUs in several countries. 
Figure 8: SUCI Latin America (Mean) 
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SUCI suggests that the violence in 1970 occurred mostly in Guatemala, Bolivia, Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile, and Brazil, whereas in 1989, violence was prevalent in Peru, El Salvador, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti, Paraguay, and Panama. As for the nonviolent SUs, 
SUCI identifies various peaks rather than a cycle. The highest peak in nonviolent uprisings 
occurred in 1969 and can be mainly attributed to the ‘Cordobazo’ movement in Argentina. 
In contrast to Latin America, Europe’s major SUCI uprisings tend to encompass only one 
country, or just a few, in a peak year. For example, Portugal’s ‘Carnation Revolution’ leads to a 
rise in violent and nonviolent SUCI in 1973 and 1975. The Carnation Revolution ended with a 
military coup, which was supported by mass movement (Griffin and Griffin, 2007). Moreover, it 
was preceded by the widespread dissatisfaction of the Portuguese population with Portugal’s 
colonial wars (Poddar et al., 2008). Another example is the uprising in the United Kingdom that 
dominates the SUCI index in 1981. Supporting groups such as Brixton Defence Campaign 
(BDC) were created, which fought against the police with increased violence (Collette and 
Laybourn, 2003). Briggs (2012) links the UK uprisings in 1982 with those in 2011, arguing that 
they have the same roots, ranging from racial concerns to unemployment. A final example is the 
Greece civil war, which dominates the index in 1946 and 1948 (Bærentzen et al., 1987). 
Figure 9: SUCI Europe (Mean) 
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South Asia’s major SUs are illustrated in Figure 10. Afghanistan has been leading the violent 
SUCI index since 1978. The Sauer Revolution in 1978 toppled Daoud and, consequently, Noor 
Taraki was appointed as the first president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (Meher, 
2008). Afghanistan’s struggle with the Taliban movement is reflected in the high violent SUCI 
value in 2003 (Lansford, 2011). The peak in violent SUCI in 1971 reflects Bangladesh’s 
liberation war. Other significant episodes of violence occurred in Nepal due to its 10-year civil 
war, which started in 1996 when the Maoist party strove to replace the parliamentary monarchy 
and the Hindu class system (Bisht, 2008). The increase in the intensity of Nepalese SU is 
reflected in high values of violent SUCI in the period from 2001 to 2006. Finally, between 1987 
and 1989, South Asia’s violent SUCI is dominated by the JVP insurrection in Sri Lanka, which 
led to the death of around 60,000 Sinhalese (DeRouen and Uk, 2007). 
The major nonviolent SUCI event took place in 1983 in India. The ‘Nellie Massacre’ is 
considered the ‘biggest riot incident in contemporary south Asia’ (Kimura, 2013, p. 22). 
Preceding the Iranian revolution, the second highest peak of nonviolent SUCI occurred in Iran in 
1978 following political mobilization by clerical activists (Clawson and Rubin, 2005). Adding to 
that, strikes started in September 1978, causing a decrease in oil exports from ‘five million 
barrels a day to two million barrels threatening to bankrupt the government’ (Clawson and 
Rubin, 2005, p. 92). Other notable episodes of nonviolent uprising took place in Bangladesh 
from 1994 until 1996. 
Figure 10: SUCI South Asia (Mean) 
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The development of SUCI in Southeast Asia is shown in Figure 11. Its most significant feature is 
the high peak in 1998 of the nonviolent index due to Indonesia’s student riots in May 1998. 
Figure 11: SUCI Southeast Asia (Mean) 
 
 
These protests led to the fall of the government and the resignation of Suharto, Indonesia’s 
president (Katsiaficas, 2012). The second significant feature is the simultaneous increase of both 
violent and nonviolent SUCI in 1970, strongly influenced by events in Cambodia, as noted 
above. The Philippines’s ‘first quarter storm’ uprising is also a significant determinant of the 
nonviolent SUCI in 1970 (Katsiaficas, 2012). 
6. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a novel social uprising composite indicator (SUCI) measuring social 
protest against the government in 200 countries over the time period from 1946 to 2011. SUCI is 
constructed to overcome ambiguities in the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with SUs. 
Despite the blurred borders between various facets of SUs, extant literature tends to concentrate 
on specific aspects of SUs in isolation. In contrast, SUCI focuses on capturing the commonality 
between these facets. Based on theoretical considerations, SUs are differentiated into two major 
categories: violent and nonviolent. This theoretical division is supported by the result of a factor 
analysis involving seven subindicators of SUs. 
Since SUCI is based on clear conceptual grounds, it can be used by empirical researchers either 
as a dependent variable or an independent variable. As a standardised index, SUCI resolves 
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consistency problems, which plagued previous quantitative studies and were due to different 
operationalisation techniques of the underlying indicator for SU. In particular, SUCI avoids 
defining SU by reference to causes and consequences, which should be the outcome of 
theoretical and empirical investigation and not included a priori in the indicator. Moreover, 
SUCI is available both for worldwide comparisons as well as specific regional analyses. The 
former allows inclusion in general studies on SUs, whereas the latter more explicitly takes into 
account regional spillover effects in SUs. The indicator also allows differentiating between 
absolute and relative severity of SUs in a country. 
SUCI is validated by showing that its variations reflect important real-world events. We discuss 
SUCI’s conceptual basis as well as its construction and provide descriptive statistics of the final 
index as well as stylised facts about regional SUs. SUCI is designed to be a tool for theory-based 
empirical research on internal conflict. A straightforward suggestion for future research is to 
analyse the causes and consequences of SUs. 
However, in deriving SUCI, arbitrary decisions had to be made. First, the choice of variables 
underlying the factor is partially constrained by the availability of subindicators. However, with 
some exceptions, SUCI appears to be stable with respect to changing variable definitions or 
extending the number of subindicators in its construction. Second, we assume that countries 
within geographical regions are subject to similar forces in the context of SUs. While we can 
show that applying the assumption that the weighing of subindicators across the worldwide 
sample generates a fairly similar indicator, country-specific weights may still be preferable. 
However, data limitations do not allow for such a disaggregated approach. Third, international 
solidarity protests are not included, as we focus on SU within one country. Fourth,  instances of 
ethnical conflicts are excluded based on the theoretical premise that these sorts of actions are not 
usually directed against the government as such.  However, in practice, we cannot exclude that 
they are related to, and have an impact on, government action. Finally, for a few regions, we face 
problems with respect to the availability and variability of subindicators, which causes our 
dataset to be an unbalanced panel. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Sample: Countries and Years  
Coverage Countries 
1946 2011 
Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, 
Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Yemen Arab Republic, Greece 
1953 2011 Cambodia, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, North Korea, South Pakistan 
1960 2011 
Austria, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia 
1967 2011 
Algeria, Barbados, Burundi, Gambia, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, 
Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Zambia 
1976 2011 Transkei, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Seychelles, Vietnam 
1978 2011 
Andorra, Botswana, Brunei, Djibouti, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu 
1992 2011 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Somaliland, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
1993 2011 Czech Republic, Eritrea, Slovak Republic 
1975 2011 Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Holy See, Mozambique, Suriname 
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Table A2: Regional Classification of Countries 
Region Countries 
Africa 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
MENA 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Bahrain, Iran 
Oceania 
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, American 
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu 
Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Yugoslavia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro 
Latin America 
Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
North America USA and Canada 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia Hungary, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Albania 
Eastern Asia 
People’s Republic of China , Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic 
of Korea 
Southern Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka 
South Eastern Asia 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor, Viet Nam 
Western Europe 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Andorra, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, San Marino, Spain  
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 Table A3: Factor Analysis Based on Regional Datasets 
 
Notes: N: Nonviolent, V: Violent.
 Africa Former East Asia South Asia 
Latin 
America 
MENA 
Eastern 
Block 
South East 
Asia 
Western 
Europe 
Oceania 
North 
America 
Factor N V N V N V N V N V N V N V N V N V N V N V 
Eigen 
values 
1.6 1.0 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.6 0.8 1.5 0.8 1.8 0.5 1.7 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.2 0.1 
Explained 
Variance 
78 47 75 49 66 51 77 48 47 84 86 44 82 46 94 28 1.1 22 1.2 1.5 1.2  
Factor Loadings After Varimax Rotation 
Demon-
stration 
0.8 0.04 0.7 0.15 0.6 0.01 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.04 0.8 0.02 0.7 0.01 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.1 
Riot 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.01 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.01 0.6 0.03 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.02 
General 
Strike 
0.3 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.04 0.2 0.6 0.02 0.5 0.04 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Guerrilla 
Warfare 
0.1 0.6 0.01 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.38 0.1 0.5 0.02 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 
Revolution 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.32 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 – – 
Magnitude 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.6 0.4 0.03 0.02 0.6 0.02 0.71 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 – – – – – – 
Intensity 0.03 0.5 0.00 0.5 0.04 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.73 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 – – 
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Figure A1: Scree plot of Eigen values Extracted by Factor Analysis 
Scree Plot Using World Dataset: 
 
Scree Plot Using Regional Datasets: 
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Determinants of Social Uprisings: An Empirical Analysis Utilizing a 
Novel Indicator 
 
Sondos Shaheen 
 
Abstract 
This paper employs a newly constructed composite indicator of social uprisings (SUCI) to 
analyze the causes of their occurrence. This empirical study is based on an unbalanced panel of 
45 countries over the period of 1982–2007. The paper’s contribution to the literature is 
distinguishing between the determinants of violent and nonviolent uprisings. The analysis shows 
that that certain variables have a significant impact on both violent and nonviolent uprisings in 
terms of relative SUCI values, for example, ethnic fractionalization and mountainous terrain. 
Nevertheless, differences between the likelihood of occurrence of violent and nonviolent 
uprisings can be found. For example, life dissatisfaction is related to nonviolent social uprisings, 
but when life dissatisfaction is accompanied by democratic dissatisfaction, violent social 
uprisings are more likely. 
Keywords: Social Uprisings, Relative Deprivation, Dissatisfaction, Mobilization, Anti-
Government Movements, Causes 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the causes of social uprising in the light of 
theoretical advancement. Empirical research shows inconsistent findings for the causes of social 
uprisings. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), the two most 
often cited large-N studies, offer contradicting explanations for the causes of social uprisings. In 
his study of insurgencies, Staniland (2012) provides a comprehensive review of these 
inconsistent causes found for social uprisings, including resources, external support, and social 
division. Dixon (2009) and Hegre and Sambinis (2006) provide a detailed analysis of possible 
reasons for such inconsistency. 
This paper takes two approaches to filling this gap in the quantitative literature: first by utilizing 
a new index for social uprisings (SUs) and, second, by operationalizing relative deprivation, thus 
offering new dependent and independent variables. The empirical analysis uses the Social 
Uprisings Composite Index (SUCI), a new index that captures both violent and nonviolent forms 
of social uprising (Hayo and Shaheen, 2014). Contrary to the prevalent approach in empirical 
studies on SUs, this paper distinguishes between two types of social uprising—violent and 
nonviolent. A theoretical review shows the importance of studying nonviolent uprising as an 
separate type of social uprising (Bond, 1988; Cunningham, 2013; Zunes,1994; Martin and 
Varney, 2003; Schock, 2003). Differentiating between the two types of SUs permits analyzing 
government reactions to SUs. Schock (2003) argues that the use of violence justifies government 
use of force. Determining whether this statement is true is beyond the scope of this paper, yet it 
illustrates the importance of dividing the analysis between violent and nonviolent SUs. 
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) were the first to empirically investigate the necessity of 
distinguishing between the two types of SUs. Utilizing their NAVCO dataset, they conducted an 
empirical replication of the study presented by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Although Chenoweth 
and Lewis (2013) contribute to the literature by pointing out that different causes do exist 
depending on the nature of the SUs, their dataset has the disadvantages of other onset binary 
variables used in the extant literature (Sambanis, 2004). SUCI has an analytical advantage over 
the NAVCO dataset in that it provides both the absolute and relative level of SUs in a country 
over the years. SUs are defined as violent or nonviolent intrastate acts of defiance by groups of 
citizens against their country’s government. “Defiance” is defined to include demonstrations, 
revolutions, riots, revolts, strikes, and coups. “Groups of citizens” include political parties, 
organized groups, students, workers, and general public support. 
The aim of this paper is to achieve a better understanding of what mobilizes a mass of people 
(i.e., “groups of citizens”) to act in defiance against their government. This defiance manifests as 
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either violent or nonviolent uprisings and is captured using SUCI. The reason for identifying 
social uprisings of two types is based on the result of factor analysis capturing the commonality 
and is intended to avoid the ambiguous terminology found in the extant literature
1
. Splitting SUs 
into these two types provides the opportunity to discover if the causes of SUs differ depending 
on their nature and is a somewhat novel approach: most empirical studies on this topic 
operationalize a certain type of action in isolation (Carey, 2006; Buhaug, 2006; Belkin and 
Schofer, 2003; Boix, 2008; Dixon, 2009). A type of action such as strike or protest is 
operationalized with a variable that is not unique to this action. For example, the number of 
deaths is used to analyze the causes of civil war, protest, and revolutions. 
This shortcoming (at least for some purposes) of the quantitative literature is this paper’s 
motivation lead to move beyond existing empirical studies and incorporate what has been 
provided for in literature. For example the occurrence of social uprisings are most likely in 
countries with mountainous terrain and relatively high level of fractionalization in the society 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Parvin, 1973; Fearon and Laitin’s 2003). In the extant literature 
empirical analysis, the discrepancy in the impact of economic growth on social movements is 
attributed to the theory of relative deprivation (Davis, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Hence, this paper’s 
second contribution is to complement the extant literature with the operationalization of relative 
deprivation (RD) utilizing a survey dataset. RD theory provides valuable understanding to 
subjective views of citizens taking part in the social uprisings that has not been extensively 
studied empirically. In this paper, new variables are operationalized from a survey dataset to 
serve as proxies for relative deprivation, which is then used as one of the core independent 
variables for the analysis. In this paper, two sets of social characteristics are argued to influence 
the level of social uprising: the degree of relative deprivation in a society, measured as 
dissatisfaction with life and/or democracy, and the degree of cohesiveness in this perception, 
measured as the standard deviation of the dissatisfaction variable. In addition to testing for the 
effect of relative deprivation on social uprising, other control variables that measure absolute 
deprivation and country-specific characteristics are also included. 
The empirical study is intended to discover how defiance varies or is similar across its different 
manifestations, with the end goal of understanding the determinants associated with higher level 
of violent and nonviolent SUs. The empirical analysis is based on unbalanced panel data 
covering 45 countries for the period from 1982 to 2007. A general-to-specific framework is used 
to test whether there are different determinants for the two types of social uprising, with a 
                                                           
1  roF full details on construction of SUCI, see Hayo and Shaheen (2014). 
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particular focus on the role played by  dissatisfaction. The analysis differentiates between 
absolute and relative dissatisfaction. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical review of various 
causality dimensions covered in the extant literature. Section 3 provides a review of empirical 
studies on the causes of social uprising. Section 4 covers the methodology employed in this 
paper. The results are provided in Section 5. Section 6 provides robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes. 
2. Extant Literature on the Causes of SUs 
Several approaches for studying the causes of SUs are provided in the literature, both theoretical 
and empirical, with a lively debate between the two camps. The debate covers issues ranging 
from the inability to operationalize proposed theory to inaccurate generalization on the part of 
empirical researchers (Lancaster and Montinola, 2001; Saxton, 2005). A third way of studying 
this topic is to employ a case study method, which is done, for example, by Brinton (1952), who 
analyzes the “Great Revolutions.” However, case studies are rarely generalizable given that they 
usually only involve one incident (Eckstein, 2000). An example of a generalized model aimed at 
understanding the SU phenomenon is the quantitative model offered by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). 
The drivers of SUs are also a matter of debate. Some researchers focus on a single driver; for 
example, ethnic groups (Toft, 2005), resource effects on mobilization (Ross, 2004), or mass 
media (Weatherburn, 2006). Other researchers have developed fully fledged models; for 
example, the rational choice model by Skocpol (1976) and the flashpoint model analyzed by 
Waddington (2010). 
In this section, some of this literature is discussed in detail as it is the starting point for 
constructing the model employed in this paper’s empirical analysis. The section is divided into 
two parts: Part A, “Causality Dimensions,” discusses studies that focus on certain dimensions in 
isolation and how they relate to and impact SUs. Part B covers examples of causality models, 
which provide a multidimensional analysis of the causes of social uprisings. 
A. Causality Dimensions 
Modernization 
Huntington argues that modernization lead to SUs. The main thesis of his book Political Order 
in Changing Societies is that violence and instability are a result of “rapid social change and 
rapid mobilization of new groups into politics with slow development of political 
institutions”(2006, p. 4). More specifically, the rate of modernization is related to the degree of 
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political instability. This argument is supported by Gillis’s (1970) analysis of European 
revolutions in the 18th century. However, a different argument to Huntington’s analysis was 
provided by Sorokin (1962) as there is no direct connection that either supports or reject the 
modernization assumption. Tilly (1973) argues that one reason for the different results of these 
two authors is methodological. Huntington’s reliance on “static cross-section comparison” is less 
comprehensive than Sorokin’s (1962) longitudinal study. Hence, it is possible that a time-
specific connection was the reason for the link between political instability and modernization. 
Resources 
Resource mobilization theory views resource availability as a direct cause of SUs (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977). Resource mobilization theory has been extensively tested, both with empirical work 
and case studies. For example, based on 13 case studies of civil war, Ross (2004) argues that 
abundant natural resources availability, especially oil and nonfuel minerals, made civil war more 
likely and that there is no correlation with agriculture dependence. This view is contravened by 
Humphreys’s (2005) empirical analysis in which he argues dependence on agriculture as a 
primary commodity makes the state more vulnerable to insurgency. A refined dataset presented 
by Humphreys (2005) illustrates that past natural resource dependence is more relevant than 
future levels in analyzing uprisings. Ross (2004) and Humphreys (2005) agree that having 
abundant resources enables the government to reduce the duration of the struggle. Debate still 
exists in literature to whether having abundant natural resources will benefit the state or the 
rebels. The grievance models argue that access to natural resources is a mobilizing factor for 
rebels. Staniland (2012) argues that it is a society’s structure and developed institutions that are 
key to whether the resources will help insurgents or the state. 
Social Division 
Knowledge of a country’s social characteristics is critical to understanding what mobilizes the 
people against their government. There are various social divisions that can be studied, including 
ethnic groups, religious groups, geographic distribution, and age structure. Staniland (2012) 
makes a link between social division and resources. He argues that having a highly segmented 
society in a country rich with resources will result in internal rivalries. Hence, for a fragmented 
society, the division of resources can hinder SUs; on the other hand, resources held by integrated 
societies may enable a SU. Staniland argues that “fragmented organizations” are a barrier to 
“robust institutions” (2012, p. 10). Therefore, institutions determine whether resources will 
prevent or provoke social uprisings. 
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Imperialist View 
Wright (1966) argues that the first colonial protests arose out of grievances and that battles are 
just an “outward sign” of “factual divergence.” He argues that “revolution arose from a conflict 
of interest not a debate over rights” (1996, p. 76). According to this author, then, it may be 
erroneous to assume that revolt against colonialism arises purely from a desire for democratic 
rights; it is just as, if not more, likely that the revolt is a due to a clash of economic interests. 
Functionalist Approach 
Marx’s explanation for why revolutionary change would occur is bound to a model of social 
change. He expected the change to occur in countries with less developed industrial structure, 
that is, revolutionary change would occur within a country, not between countries (Cohan, 1975). 
A contradictory view is presented by the functionalist approach to analyzing revolutions. For 
example, Talcott Parson argues that conflict is not due to the fact that “one class has the goods” 
but to the absolute scarcity of valuable goods in a society (Cohan, 1975 p. 120). This is the 
motivation for distinguishing between relative and absolute deprivation. 
B. Model Analysis 
Waddington (2010) developed the “Flashpoints Model of Public Disorders.” This model, 
although originally designed to study riots in Sheffield area during the 1980s, has been refined 
and is now appropriate for investigating “both violent and nonviolent crowd events over the 
world and across history” (Prince, 2012, p. 395). Waddington’s (2010) essential argument is that 
public movements cannot be explained by one variable and thus his “Flashpoints Model” 
encompasses six dimensions: political, ideological, cultural, contextual, situational, and 
interactional. This multidimensional model is appropriate for analyzing political demonstrations 
(Weatherburn, 2006); however, it is not useful for empirical analysis, and this failure to provide 
statistical analysis limits it generalizability. 
Another model, proposed by McAdam et al. (1996), is designed to investigate the political 
opportunity for social change. The authors argue that four dimensions provide an opportunity for 
a social change: openness of the political system, stability of elite alignment, presence of elite 
allies, and the state’s repressive capacities. This model, however, is subject to some of the same 
criticisms as is Waddington’s Flashpoint Model, specifically that it is inoperational and 
endogenous to political mobilization (Lawrence, 2010). 
Gurr (1970) conducts a careful study of “strife events,” providing a model that incorporates 
many of the previously mentioned dimensions. His empirical analysis takes the form of 
correlation coefficients that relate variations in the conflict variable to variations in underlying 
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dimensions. He provides a level of generalization by giving explanatory weight to the 
illegitimacy of the regime, problems in communication within the country, external country 
intervention with material support, existence of illegal parties, economic discrimination, political 
discrimination, and religious fractionalization. Based on significant statistical results, Gurr 
extended his analysis to investigate the relationship between rebellion and economic 
discrimination, studying in detail the concept of unfulfilled expectation and hence differentiating 
between relative and absolute deprivation. The issue of relative deprivation is taken up by the 
structuralist school, which posits that SUs are a result of economic disappointment. This view 
assumes that if the disappointment becomes “sufficiently” widespread, there will be a SU. 
 
Relative Deprivation 
This paper’s main interest is to understand the determinants that increase the liklehood of social 
uprising. Relative deprivation is a core element for this empirical study as it helps in 
understanding the motivation behind certain actions. Therefore, in this section, a detailed 
analysis of the concept of relative deprivation is provided. Relative deprivation (RD) is studied 
in various fields of social sciences; indeed, it is said that “RD is a social psychological concept 
par excellence” (Smith et al., 2012, p. 203). Relative deprivation is an individual’s dissatisfaction 
due to a gap between his current state compared to that of a reference group. 
The theory of relative deprivation often shows up in the field of economic analysis. For example, 
studies on poverty, resource allocation, and migration are among the many that consider relative 
deprivation in their analysis (Sen, 2004; Townsend, 1987; Runciman, 1966). Runciman (1966) 
provides the most commonly used economic definition of relative deprivation. Among the first 
scholars to link relative deprivation with SUs are Davies (1962) and Gurr (Ramirez, 1981). 
However, operationalization approaches aimed at theoretical advancement are scarce; indeed, 
Pettegrew once stated in one of his lectures that economists “have given up on using relative 
deprivation.”2 Most work on relative deprivation falls under the rubric of experimental 
economics and is based on games such as “performance incentives in career games” (Paul, 1991, 
p. 337). Conceptually, there are two hurdles to studying relative deprivation: discontent is too 
common in politically stable societies and the threshold of discontent is unknown (Kuran, 1991). 
Nevertheless, a few scholars have attempted to empirically analyze relative deprivation. For 
example, Charkravarty and Charkraborty (1984) and Yitzhaki (1979) provide theoretically-based 
propositions for indices of relative deprivation. Yitzhaki (1979) proposes using the average 
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 “Relative Deprivation: A Valuable Individual Predictor,” November 16, 2012, Marburg University. 
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income in a society multiplied by the Gini coefficient to measure relative deprivation in a 
society. The idea is that the society’s relative deprivation is an aggregate of individual values. 
Moreover, Yitzhaki posits that satisfaction and deprivation are complementary and thus that 
using either one or the other will provide similar results (p. 323). Charkravarty and Charkraborty 
(1984) build on Yitzhaki and view his measure of relative deprivation as a “normative index.” 
Charkravarty and Charkraborty see an index as representing only one social welfare function. 
The use of a “normative averaging rule” allows deriving an index of average deprivation. 
Charkravarty and Charkraborty view marginal deprivation as a focus of their normative average 
rule, which they define by quoting Runicman (1966), who said that “the magnitude of relative 
deprivation is the extent of the difference between the desired situation and that of the person 
desiring it” (Charkravarty and Charkraborty, 1984, p. 284). This perspective provides a concave 
social welfare function that takes individual deprivation into account. 
Stark (1984) employs the concept of relative deprivation to theoretically analyze migration from 
rural to urban areas. Empirical support for the theory of relative deprivation is provided in a 
paper by Stark and Taylor (1989) that studies migration from Mexico to the United States. This 
empirical study supports the hypothesis that potential gain in absolute income is an important 
factor in migration decisions. Therefore, in the current paper’s empirical analysis, absolute as 
well as relative deprivation dimensions are considered. The literature considers the absolute level 
of deprivation as an additional explanation for dissatisfaction with a country’s economic and 
social conditions (Kawachi et al., 1999; Foster, 1998; Anderson and Esposito, 2013; Duclos, J. 
and Grégoire, 2002; Sen, 2004). Kawachi et al. (1999) argue that absolute deprivation, measured, 
for example, as poverty, unemployment, and low education, is a critical element in 
understanding the overall level of dissatisfaction. Foster (1998) argues for using the poverty line 
level as a threshold because it is constant even in cases of economic growth. Below this 
threshold level, dissatisfaction is so strong that it can lead to apathy and/or inactivity (ØStby et 
al., 2009, p. 303). According to Heldt (1999), dissatisfaction is driven by the relative level of 
deprivation, not by the state of the economy. In this paper, both absolute and relative deprivation, 
referred to in the literature as double relative deprivation (Foster and Matheson, 1995), are 
studied.  
3. Empirical Survey 
A survey of the SU empirical literature reveals that the main focus has been on violent 
movements; indeed, there almost seems to be an assumption that SUs need to be violent. This 
has led to a debate over whether nonviolent movements are entitled to be called revolutions. 
Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) give three reasons for why nonviolent SUs, compared to 
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violent, are less studied: (1) they are more difficult to measure, (2) some scholars consider 
nonviolent SUs to be passive, and (3) violent SUs receive more global attention, giving their 
study a sense of urgency. As to reason (2), however, a quick glance at nonviolent SUs shows 
them to be anything but passive. Indeed, nonviolent action is being increasingly used as a means 
to combat injustice and oppression (Carter, 2005). Bond provides a “common sense” definition 
of nonviolent movement as being that in which there is no “intention to cause physical injury or 
harm in that particular effort” (1988, p. 82). The extant literature does not give much attention to 
the difference in determinants between the likelihood violent and nonviolent SUs. Cunningham 
(2013) explains this lacuna as being the result of studying violent and nonviolent SUs separately, 
with studies of violent SUs often based on a civil war dataset. Nevertheless, these empirical 
studies provide valuable information that serves as the basis for the choice of variables in this 
paper. 
In the literature, number of deaths is one of the most commonly used proxies for social uprisings. 
Number of deaths may be interesting for specific research questions but the statistic in no way 
explains why people defy their government. Hence, this dependent variable is not used in the 
current analysis. Another dependent variable often used in the literature is event onset. However, 
even onset is a binary variable and does not contain much, if any, information about the duration 
and intensity of social uprisings. Due to the nature of this variable, this analysis employs logit 
and probit modeling. 
Based on a cross-section dataset, Parvin (1973) argues that income inequality is a contributor to 
political unrest. Parvin finds that higher income growth can actually induce violence. This 
finding supports Gurr (1970) as the increase in income will intensify relative deprivation. Gurr 
argues that economic development poses an increased risk of political unrest due to unfilled 
expectations. However, Parvin continues his analysis by stating that relative deprivation is only 
of secondary importance compared to absolute level of deprivation. A shortcoming of Parvin’s 
empirical study of political unrest is its use of number of deaths as a dependent variable. 
Carey makes an important contribution to the empirical study of political unrest by stressing the 
importance of feedback loops. He shows that political unrest is a result of “unitary actors” 
responding to each other (2006, p. 3). Carey views both government and opposition as unitary 
actors. The opposition’s goal is to bring about change in the government or its policies. 
However, Carey does not incorporate the theory of deprivation and his analysis is restricted to 
incidents of political unrest in nine countries. 
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The two most frequently cited empirical papers on the economic determinants of social uprisings 
are Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), both of which are large-N studies. 
Contrary to Parvin (1973), Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) empirical analysis shows that economic 
growth may correlate with fewer civil wars. Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not focus on relative 
deprivation, but on ethnic fractionalization, making their work complementary to that of Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004), who found that ethnic fractionalization does not increase the probability of 
civil war. Parvin (1973), Carey (2006), Collier and Hoeffer (2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
are all based on incidences of civil war, that is violent episodes of SUs. Chenoweth and Lewis 
(2013) replicate the model provided by Fearon and Laitin (2003), but advance the empirical 
literature by differentiating between violent and nonviolent SUs. They find that the only 
common factor between violent and nonviolent SUs is that a country with a larger  population is 
more likely to experience SUs; for the rest of the variables, Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) 
obtained reversed or insignificant results. 
 
4. Methodology 
This paper uses a general-to-specific approach for identifying determinants associated with 
violent and nonviolent SUs. The general model starts with large set of variables, chosen based on 
the extant literature. The model is then restricted to significant variables (Hoover and Perez, 
1999). The restriction is based on a series of F-tests for insignificant variables (Krolzig and 
Hendry, 2001). The novel contribution of this empirical study is its use of new operationalized 
variables in its regression analysis. For the independent variables, the SUCI is used as a 
measurement for SUs. The key dependent variables—democracy and life dissatisfaction—are 
operationalized to empirically test the relative deprivation theory. Due to data limitations, the 
empirical analysis is conducted with an unbalanced panel of 45 countries for the period from 
1982 to 2007. A list of the included countries can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Empirical Model 
A random effects model is employed in the general-to-specific approach of obtaining a restricted 
model for discovering the causes of SUs. The random effects model accounts for heterogeneity 
among the sample countries, thus allowing the discovery of variations beyond those associated 
with fixed effects. A pooled OLS model is not used due to an unobserved state-level error term 
(Wooldridge, 2003). Additionally, the “RE estimator is more efficient than pooled OLS” 
(Antweiler, 2001, p. 132). Using a random effects model with a panel dataset allows controlling 
for nested characteristics of the underlying countries. There are two reasons for preferring a 
random effects model over a fixed effects one. First, the random effects model allows controlling 
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for country-specific time-invariant characteristics, which is not possible with a fixed effects 
model. Second, the Hausman test supports the choice of a random effects model. However, as it 
could be argued that the Hausman test is not a strong enough reason for final model choice, in a 
robustness check the model is re-estimated using fixed effects. 
The Dependent Variables 
This paper uses the Social Uprisings Composite Indicator (SUCI) with its two components, 
violent and nonviolent SUs, in separate empirical models (Hayo and Shaheen, 2014). In contrast 
to the usual practice of using binary dependent variables, SUCI is a continuous variable and 
captures occurrences and intensity levels of SUs. SUCI is available for both the relative and 
absolute levels of SUs. Relative SUCI is calculated based on region-specific factor analysis and 
hence is more sensitive to regional intensity levels of SUs. Absolute levels of SUs are based on a 
factor analysis of a world dataset. To create a general model, it is beneficial to study the causes 
of SUs from both perspectives so as to differentiate between region-specific and world-general 
contributing factors. Therefore, as dependent variables this paper uses both relative and absolute 
levels for the two components of SUCI, violent and nonviolent SUs. The relative SUCI is 
presented in the Table 1; the other models can be found in Tables A3 and A4 of the Appendix. 
Independent Variables 
Explanatory variables are divided into four groups: dissatisfaction levels, socioeconomic 
variables, political dimensions, and time-invariant variables. The first three groups of 
explanatory variables are lagged to understand their relation to the likelihood of occurrence of 
SUs. As controls, dummy variables for years and regions are included in the empirical model. 
Dissatisfaction Levels 
A review of the literature reveals the importance of considering relative deprivation theory in 
analyzing the likelihood of SUs. However, lack of data makes this difficult. Nevertheless, a 
subjective view of relative deprivation can be captured with representative survey data, which is 
accomplished here by operationalizaiton of the Barometer surveys. The Barometer surveys have 
better coverage than the World Values Survey in regard to both number of countries and time 
dimensions. To operationalize relative deprivation, data are extracted from the Asia, Arab, 
America, Europe, and Afro Barometer surveys (Chu et al., 2013; Abderebbi et al., 2010; 
Leonard, 2012; European Commission, 2012; Centre for Democratic Development, 2008). The 
Barometer surveys are nationally representative surveys of non-institutionalized adults older than 
18 years. The number of survey waves varies across different regions, with minimum of two 
waves per country for a total of 45 countries. As defined in literature, relative deprivation can be 
in terms of politics or economics. The operationalization of two questions asked in the 
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Barometer surveys provides valuable information on the levels of dissatisfaction with well-being 
and democracy in a country. The relevant questions from the Barometer survey are reproduced in 
Table A2 of the Appendix. The two questions of interest have to do with the respondents’ 
satisfaction with their well being and the level of democracy in their country. The population 
shares are calculated to operationalize these two questions. The computed variables are then used 
as the primary independent variables for the empirical study. In addition to the population share 
of satisfaction level, the standard deviation from the survey respondents is calculated as an 
additional control variable. The standard deviation gives valuable information about the unity of 
population share responses. Double deprivation is considered by accounting for relative 
deprivation in the levels of dissatisfaction and absolute deprivation in additional explanatory 
variables that are described below. 
The link between SUCI and dissatisfaction levels is shown in Figures 1 and 2. SUCI violent and 
nonviolent indicators are divided into quartiles to show different intensity levels of SUs. The 
average level of dissatisfaction with both life and democracy is then provided for every quartile. 
Surprisingly, Figure 1 reveals that the highest intensity levels of violent SUs, as presented in the 
fourth quartile, correspond to the lowest level of democracy dissatisfaction and are equivalent to 
mean life dissatisfaction levels in the first quartile.  
 
Figure 1: Quartiles of Violent SUCI and Dissatisfaction Levels 
 
Figure 2 shows a comparable trend; however, in the case of nonviolent SUs, the highest levels of 
dissatisfaction correspond to nonviolent SUs in the third quartile. 
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Figure 2: Quartiles of Nonviolent SUCI and Dissatisfaction Levels 
 
 
These two figures are perplexing in that they show no direct link between the intensity of SUs 
and the level of dissatisfaction. However, they do confirm the theoretical notion that although 
dissatisfaction is a critical element in causing SUs, lack of knowledge as to the triggering 
threshold level is a major problem. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the two main variables of relative deprivation. In this figure, 
the means for both life and democracy dissatisfaction population shares are graphically 
represented with a reference to the average SUCI values, with regional divisions indicated. Note 
that the average population share of dissatisfaction in a single year never exceeds 25%. 
 
Figure 3: Dissatisfaction and SUCI 
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Time-Invariant Variables 
One reason for including time-invariant variables is to control for differences across countries in 
the panel dataset. Country characteristics provide insight into the causes of SUs. Another reason 
is that time-invariant variables are among the most commonly used in the empirical literature 
that analyzes cases of civil war. An argument against using time-invariant variables is that 
although they can indicate the probability of SUs, they cannot predict the onset of SUs 
(Lawrence, 2010). Time-invariant variables fail to address temporal variation and hence cannot 
be considered as triggers for SU. Examples of macro factors include rough terrain, ethnic 
domination, natural resources, and type of regime. The research question can be focused on 
predicting when a SU occur or more generally aim to understand its general features. In large-N 
studies, the aim is not to explain when the SUs will happen, but to generally characterize them 
(Lawrence, 2010, p. 122). For the general empirical model, colonial history,
3
 ethnic, religious, 
and linguistic fractionalization,
4
 languages,
5
 geography both in terms of terrain and access to the 
sea,
6
 and mineral resources are considered as potential factors in SUs. Figure 4 shows that SUCI 
levels are considerably higher in countries rich with mineral resources and nearly nonexistent 
otherwise. 
Figure4: SUCI Level and Mineral Resources 
 
 
  
                                                           
3 Colonial history is coded 1 if the country has never been colonized by a Western overseas colonial power. Source: 
Bernard et al. (2004). 
4 Ethnic and religious fractionalization is a measure of how the population is fractionalized. Source: Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). 
5 Two variables are included for the language dimension. The country’s official language and language 
fractionalization in the country. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
6
 Mountainous terrain: The proportion of a country’s terrain that is mountainous. Source: Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004). 
Access to the sea: A country that borders the ocean (a “coastal economy”) and that has a container port is given a 
value of 0, reflecting complete access to international shipping. A landlocked country without navigable access to 
the sea via rivers is given a value of 1. 
Source: (Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
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Political Dimensions 
Governance
7
 and new constitutions
8
 are the two political dimension variables. Governance is 
measured using the Polity IV dataset in which countries are ranked from autocratic to 
democratic. Figure 5 shows the average SUCI level per governance scale; hence the dataset does 
not focus on just one governance type. New constitutions is a dummy variable indicating with a 
value of 1 that a new constitution was adopted in this country for a certain year. Very few 
changes occur in these two variables as they tend to be constant over time. However, since any 
such changes could be triggers for SUs, they are included as a separate category of this empirical 
analysis. 
Figure 5: Governance and SUCI 
 
 
Socioeconomic Variables 
The literature distinguishes between relative and absolute deprivation. Relative deprivation is 
captured by the dissatisfaction variables; absolute deprivation in a country can be captured with 
macroeconomic variables. The absolute deprivation dimension is captured with country macro-
economic indicators. The macro-level variables included in the empirical analysis are 
unemployment,
9
 GDP/capita, and GDP growth.
10
 Some demographic variables commonly used 
in literature are included as additional controls: total population, population growth, and 
population under the age of 15.
11
 
  
                                                           
7 Polity score. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2012). 
8 New constitution. Source: Widner (2008). 
9 Unemployment: The share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
Source: World Bank (2012b). 
10 GDP per capita and GDP growth rate. Source: Heston et al. (2009). 
11 Age dependency: Age dependency ratio, young, is the ratio of younger dependents—people younger than 15—to 
the working-age population—those ages 15–64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 100 working-
age population. Source: World Bank (2012a). 
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Table 1 : Random Effect Panel Regression 
 
Dependent variable Violent Nonviolent  
 
Model 
RE RE 
 
General Restricted General Restricted 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 
Life Dissatisfaction (%) 0.06** 0.06*** 0.03 0.06*** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Life Dissatisfaction (s.d) -1.88 -1.27** -1.52 -1.98*** 
 
(2.04) (0.57) (1.77) (0.51) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (%) 0.03* 0.02* -0.00   
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)   
Democracy Dissatisfaction (s.d.) -3.51*** -2.73*** -0.56   
 
(1.31) (1.02) (1.14)   
Democracy x Life Dissatisfaction -0.18** -0.15*** 0.10*   
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)   
T
im
e
 I
n
v
a
ri
a
n
t 
No Colonial History 0.75** 0.68*** 0.40 0.32** 
 
(0.35) (0.13) (0.31) (0.13) 
Religious Fractionalization -0.10   0.19   
 
(0.47)   (0.41)   
Ethnic Fractionalization 1.10*** 0.92*** 0.73** 0.53** 
 
(0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (0.26) 
Language Fractionalization -0.53* -0.39 -0.52* -0.26 
 
(0.30) (0.25) (0.26) (0.23) 
Official Language 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
No Access to the Sea -0.03   -0.10   
 
(0.16)   (0.14)   
Mountainous 0.07* 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.04* 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Oil 1.48** 1.46*** 0.41   
  (0.59) (0.47) (0.51)   
S
o
ci
o
-E
co
n
o
m
ic
  
Unemployment 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP/Capita (Log) -0.19 -0.09** 0.08   
 
(0.13) (0.05) (0.11)   
GDP Growth (%) -0.02 -0.02 -0.03*   
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)   
Total Population -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Growth 0.10 0.02 0.24** 0.06 
 
(0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
Population % under age of 15 -0.00   -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.01)   (0.01) (0.00) 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l Governance (Autocratic-Democratic) 0.01   0.01   
 
(0.01)   (0.01)   
New Constitution -0.42   -0.12   
  (0.64)   (0.55)   
 
Time and Region Dummies are included 
 
Constant 1.33 0.31 -1.07 -0.45* 
 
  (1.59) (0.52) (1.38) (0.27) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Regression Results 
The regression results in Table 1 use violent and nonviolent indicators from the relative SUCI 
dataset as the dependent variables. Using the absolute SUCI dataset leads to similar results; any 
differences will be indicated. The full regression output using absolute SUCI is set out in Table 
A3 of the Appendix. SUCI is constructed to be standardized across countries, thus allowing 
interpretation of the regressors’ coefficients and their influence on the final SUCI level in the 
model. 
The regression output presented in Table 1 shows a difference between the determinants 
associated with violent and nonviolent uprisings. This difference is most prominent in the 
dissatisfaction group of variables. Within this group, nonviolent SUs are more likely due to life 
dissatisfaction, but violent uprisings are associated with both life and democracy dissatisfaction. 
In contrast to violent SUs, democracy dissatisfaction is rejected from the restricted model for 
nonviolent SUs. Cohesion in opinion is a critical factor for SUs. The negative coefficient for life 
dissatisfaction standard deviation, which is significant for both violent and nonviolent SUs, 
indicates a more coherent opinion within the population share. This illustrates that common 
opinion is necessary for mobilizing a mass of people to defy their government. That there are 
differences between the likelihood of violent and nonviolent SUs is also supported by using the 
absolute dataset. Indeed, the differences are even more prominent with this dataset as only 
democracy dissatisfaction is statistically significant for violent SUs and life dissatisfaction is 
significant for nonviolent SUs. 
That violent and nonviolent SUs are associated with different types of dissatisfaction is easily 
understood. A SU that occurs due to discontent with democracy aims to topple the system and 
obtain change. This can be expected to be strongly resisted by the current government, leading to 
a more violent confrontation. On the other hand, a SU that occurs solely due to dissatisfaction 
with living conditions has as its chief objective not a change in government structure, but a 
change in or adoption of policies that will improve the quality of life. However, the reasons a SU 
begins does not dictate its outcome. A SU may start as a nonviolent movement but if the 
government is excessively intransigent, the situation may escalate into a nonnegotiable demand 
for regime change. A real-world example of such a case is the Arab Spring. At their start, these 
SUs were not directly aimed at toppling the regime; however, when the population’s demands 
met with resistance, they situation escalated and resulted in regime change. 
Inconsistent output between the absolute and relative datasets for the interaction term makes it 
difficult to generalize the relationship between life and democratic dissatisfaction. In the relative 
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dataset, this relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level for violent SUs. The negative 
coefficient for the interaction term rejects the assumption that coexistence of both 
dissatisfactions leads to violent SUs, whereas a difference in dissatisfaction levels between life 
and democracy leads to nonviolent SUs. That assumption was based on Figure 3’s display of 
SUCI levels and regional dissatisfaction. Using the absolute SUs dataset, the interaction variable 
is insignificant for violent uprisings and significant at the 5% level for nonviolent uprisings. 
The second group of time-invariant variables shows that there are no significant differences 
between the causes of violent and nonviolent SUs. The empirical outputs show statistically 
significant positive coefficients for no colonial history, ethnic fractionalization, and mountainous 
terrain for both violent and nonviolent SUs. The positive coefficients for all the previous 
variables, using absolute and relative datasets, show that a country with no colonial history, high 
ethnic divisions, and a high percentage of mountainous region are more prone to SUs. With 
regard to the fractionalization variables, only ethnic fractionalization is significant; the other 
fractionalization variables were rejected for the restricted models. The significance of ethnic 
fractionalization for both violent and nonviolent uprisings, in both the absolute and relative 
datasets, supports the strand of literature that finds ethnic divisions to be important in explaining 
social uprisings. 
The mountainous terrain variable confirms previous empirical findings on the association 
between this type of geography and violent uprisings. Moreover, when using the SUCI variable, 
it turns out that mountainous terrain is also related to nonviolent uprisings. Prior literature 
focuses on civil war and explains that mountainous terrain is a significant factor in this type of 
conflict in that it allows rebel groups to organize themselves in areas difficult for the government 
to control. 
The official language and oil variables were significant at the 1% level only for violent SUs. An 
increase in the number of official languages can be linked to the number of ethnic divisions, so it 
was surprising to see that linguistic fractionalization is not significant. Having more than one 
official language could be interpreted as an indirect indication that the government officially 
recognize subgroups in the community. Violent uprisings are also linked with democracy 
dissatisfaction; hence a larger number of officially recognized languages possibly implies a 
greater interest in changing the regime. However, linguistic fractionalization does not capture an 
official statistic, but is instead defined as “the probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same linguistic group.” 
As revealed by the literature review, time-invariant variables are not appropriate for capturing 
SU triggers; however, in large-N studies they are useful for helping to identify which 
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characteristics give a region a higher probability of SUs. The empirical model presented in this 
paper confirms the inability of time-invariant variables to shed any light on SU triggers: the 
time-invariant variables employed in this paper’s random effects model could not 
unambiguously differentiate between the violent and nonviolent uprisings. Hence, the fixed 
effect model is reconsidered and presented in a robustness test. 
The third group of socioeconomic variables showed surprising results. GDP/capita and total 
population were the only two variables significant for violent SUs and none of the variables 
remained significant in the restricted model. The surprising result is that in this model, 
nonviolent uprisings are associated with life dissatisfaction, and yet the macroeconomic 
variables were not statistically significant. This finding could be the result of using an 
unbalanced panel. Therefore, they were omitted from the restricted model. 
 
6. Robustness Check 
In recognition that time-invariant variables cannot distinguish between the causes of violent and 
nonviolent SUs and that the Hausman test is not a strong enough reason for using a random 
effects model, in this section the model is recalculated using fixed effects with robust standard 
errors. The pooled OLS model utilizing Newey-West standard errors was rejected despite its 
ability to deal with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). The pooled 
OLS model cannot control for country-level heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the OLS model was 
run using country dummies and the results can be found in Table A3 of the Appendix. The 
output of the fixed effects model is provided in Table 2. This regression is also conducted with 
the unbalanced panel dataset using both absolute and relative SUCI datasets. The regression 
outputs support the conclusion derived from the random effects model: there is a clear difference 
between the determinants associated with violent and nonviolent SUs. 
Democratic dissatisfaction variables are significant only for violent SUs. Life dissatisfaction is 
significant for both violent and nonviolent SUs. The fixed effect model shows statistical 
significance for GDP/capita at the 5% level for both violent and nonviolent SUs. The negative 
coefficient of GDP/capita means that a less developed economy is more likely to experience a 
SU. As for the political dimension, the fixed effect results are consistent with the random effect 
model findings, and thus these variables are omitted from the fixed effects restricted model. 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Panel Regression 
 
  
Region (FE) World (FE) 
  Dependent variable  Violent Nonviolent Violent Nonviolent 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 
Life Dissatisfaction (%) 0.06* 0.03* 0.00 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Life Dissatisfaction (s.d) 0.75 -2.10*** 1.97 -1.56** 
  (2.68) (0.73) (1.61) (0.65) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (%) 0.03*   0.02** 0.01 
  (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (s.d.) -3.60**   -2.11** -1.83 
  (1.67)   (1.00) (1.30) 
Democracy x Life Dissatisfaction -0.23*** 0.09* -0.06 0.10* 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
S
o
ci
o
-E
co
n
o
m
ic
  
Unemployment -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDP/Capita (Log) -1.36** -0.28** -0.80** -0.21** 
  (0.55) (0.11) (0.33) (0.10) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Total Population -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population Growth 0.03 0.34 -0.16 0.27 
  (0.27) (0.25) (0.16) (0.22) 
Population % under age of 15 -0.03   -0.03   
  (0.03)   (0.02)   
P
o
li
ti
ca
l Governance (Autocratic-Democratic)         
          
New Constitution -0.85   -0.86**   
  (0.60)   (0.36)   
 Control Dummies Year and Region Dummies Included 
 
Constant 16.40** 1.60 10.51** 0.87 
 
  (7.15) (1.49) (4.29) (1.30) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper utilizes the novel Social Uprisings Composite Indicator (SUCI) to empirically 
analyze whether there are different factors associated with violent and nonviolent social 
uprisings. The model is constructed to include major elements derived from the extant literature 
by utilizing a general-to-specific reduction methodology. SUCI allows the analysis to be 
conducted separately for violent and nonviolent uprisings. The random effects models are 
applied to an unbalanced dataset of 45 countries over the period 1982–2007. 
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The chief result of this paper is that there are, indeed, different determinants associated with 
violent and nonviolent SUs. The distinction is most prominent in the dissatisfaction dimensions. 
Citizens’ dissatisfaction with their current situation is relevant in the context of relative 
deprivation. The output showed that a coherent opinion, measured by low level of standard 
deviation, accompanied by a high percentage of life dissatisfaction can lead to nonviolent SUs. If 
life dissatisfaction is accompanied by democratic dissatisfaction, the probability of a violent SU 
increases. No clear differences between the determinants of violent and nonviolent SUs can be 
found in time-invariant, political, or socioeconomic variables. 
This paper’s chief contribution is its use of SUCI as an indicator for the dependent variable that 
allowed distinguishing between violent and nonviolent SUs, along with its use of data from the 
Barometer surveys to measure relative deprivation. Dissatisfaction was found to be the main 
differentiating factor. The limitation of the empirical study is the model’s restricted range of 
application due to data unavailability. Deriving a general model applicable worldwide will 
require more observations. More specifically, being able to add more lagged periods for the 
macroeconomic variables and having a dynamic panel would have improved the model. One 
suggestion for future research is to incorporate relative deprivation theory with a focus on 
dissatisfaction as a motivator for people’s actions; however, this will require a cross-country 
dataset. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Country Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Barometer Survey Excerpt  
Afro Barometer 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [South Africa]? 
Variable Name Dmpsat 
Variable Label Satisfaction with Democracy 
Value Labels 0=This country is not a democracy, 1=Very 
dissatisfied, 2=Somewhat dissatisfied 3=Neutral, 
4=Somewhat satisfied, 5=Very satisfied, 9=Don’t 
Know, 97=Not Applicable, 98=Refused to Answer, 
99=Missing Data 
Americas Barometer (Paraguay) 
Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works in the Paraguay?  
Variable Name Pn4 
Variable Label Democracy Satisfaction 
Value Labels (1) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Dissatisfied, (4) 
Very dissatisfied, (88) DK, (98) DA  
 
 
  
Region Countries 
Africa Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania 
Asia 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand 
Eastern Bloc Hungary, Poland 
Latin America 
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay 
MENA Algeria, Morocco, Turkey 
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Table A3: Random Effects using Region(Relative) and World (Absolute) SUCI 
 
Region  World  
Dependent variable  violent nonviolent Violent Nonviolent 
Life Dissatisfaction (%) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Life Dissatisfaction (s.d) -1.27** -1.98*** 0.24 -1.08** 
  (0.57) (0.51) (1.22) (0.49) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (%) 0.02* 
 
0.02** 0.00 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (s.d.) -2.73*** 
 
-1.82** -0.48 
  (1.02) 
 
(0.82) (0.91) 
Democracy x Life Dissatisfaction -0.15*** 
 
-0.04 0.11** 
  (0.05)   (0.04) (0.05) 
No Colonial History 0.68*** 0.32** 0.51** 0.25* 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) 
Religious Fractionalization   
 
-0.51* 0.01 
    
 
(0.31) (0.20) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.92*** 0.53** 0.68*** 0.49** 
  (0.29) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) 
Language Fractionalizaiton -0.39 -0.26 -0.07 -0.51** 
  (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) 
Official Language 0.12*** -0.02 0.05*** -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
No Access to the Sea   
 
-0.07 0.01 
    
 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Mountainous 0.07*** 0.04* 0.06** 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Oil 1.46*** 
 
1.19*** -0.17 
  (0.47)   (0.36) (0.40) 
Unemployment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP/Capita (Log) -0.09** 
 
-0.20** -0.03 
  (0.05) 
 
(0.08) (0.05) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.02 
 
-0.00 -0.02* 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Total Population -0.01*** 0.01 -0.01*** 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population Growth 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.09 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Population % under age of 15   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Governance (Autocratic-Democratic)     0.01* 0.01** 
    
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
New Constitution   
 
-0.80** -0.07 
      (0.36) (0.41) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Pooled OLS using Region(Relative) and World (Absolute) SUCI 
  
World Region 
  Dependent variable  Nonviolent Violent Nonviolent Violent 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 
Life Dissatisfaction (%) 0.05* -0.02 0.04 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
Life Dissatisfaction (s.d) -3.51* 2.25 -4.98 1.27 
  (2.03) (1.69) (3.19) (2.08) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (%) 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Democracy Dissatisfaction (s.d.) -0.80 -1.38 -1.12 -1.35 
  (1.46) (1.24) (1.90) (1.25) 
Democracy x Life Dissatisfaction 0.01 0.02 0.15 -0.10* 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.13) (0.06) 
T
im
e 
In
v
a
ri
a
n
t 
No Colonial History   -7.71 1.54   
    (8.81) (12.52)   
Religious Fractionalization     0.00   
      (5.81)   
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (21.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Language Fractionalizaiton   0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Official Language 0.35** 1.64 1.28 1.04 
  (0.18) (2.19) (0.83) (1.00) 
No Access to the Sea     -2.43   
      (9.80)   
Mountainous     -0.27 -0.39 
      (2.16) (1.16) 
Oil 2.46*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.78) (3.33) (0.00) (0.95) 
S
o
ci
o
-E
co
n
o
m
ic
  
Unemployment   -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
GDP/Capita (Log)   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.01** -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Total Population -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Population Growth 0.02 -0.06 0.58 0.24 
  (0.29) (0.17) (0.53) (0.33) 
Population % under age of 15   0.01 0.00 0.02 
    (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l Governance (Autocratic-Democratic) 0.01   -0.02   
  (0.03)   (0.59)   
New Constitution   -0.73* 0.08 -0.50* 
    (0.39) (0.49) (0.30) 
 Control Dummies Year and country dummies included 
 
Constant -1.04 5.96 -2.46 -1.84 
 
  (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Impact of Recipients’ Social Uprisings on Donors’ Foreign Aid 
Allocation 
 
Sondos Shaheen 
 
Abstract 
Foreign aid is an invaluable source of support for countries in transition. There are many events 
that can put a country into a period of transition, and social uprisings fall into this category. 
Social uprisings might be seen as either an opportunity or a threat for a donor nation. In this 
study, foreign aid allocation decisions are empirically analyzed using a three-dimensional panel 
(recipient-donor-year) for the period from 1970 to 2011. The analysis incorporates commonly 
used control variables in regard to recipient need and donor interest, and also includes social 
uprisings as a novel dimension using the Social Uprisings Composite Indicator (SUCI). The 
empirical analysis highlights the importance of adding social uprisings to the commonly used 
dimensions of aid allocation. Including social uprisings could change the extant literature 
findings.  
 
Key Word: Foreign Aid, Social Uprisings, Aid Allocation, Determinants 
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1. Introduction 
How aid affects economic development is a much researched topic and it is generally conceded 
that the aid receipt is beneficial for a country’s economy (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Tezanos et al., 
2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Mekashaa and Tar, 2013), although some studies are less sanguine 
about the benefits to the recipient nation (Doucouliagosa and Paldam, 2011; Conyers and 
Mellors, 2005; Morrissey, 2004; Headey, 2008). This paper is not concerned with the 
effectiveness of aid, but with aid allocation decisions made by donor countries. One of the 
paper’s chief aims is to empirically test, from a donor’s perspective, the impact of social 
uprisings (SUs) on bilateral foreign aid allocation. 
Bilateral aid is that which is transferred directly from a donor nation to a recipient. In such cases, 
it is thought that donors tend to provide aid based on their own commercial and geopolitical 
interests, rather than on the developmental concerns of the recipient country (Younas, 2008). 
Bilateral aid allocation is relatively strongly related to a single country’s policies, and less 
focused on humanitarian assistance, which is the type of aid multilateral institutions are more 
likely to provide (Hawkins et al., 2006). While acknowledging that there are various channels 
through which and reasons for granting aid, this paper investigates the determinants of donors’ 
bilateral aid allocation (Raschky and Schwindt, 2012). 
A review of the extant literature makes clear that the link between foreign aid and social 
uprisings needs to be conceptualized and empirically studied. For example, countries emerging 
from conflict have a high need for assistance; “from Cambodia to Bosnia, El Salvador to 
Rwanda, and Tajikistan to Lebanon, bilateral donors have supported post conflict peace building 
with generous packages of assistance” (Forman, 2000). Generous packages of assistance are one 
form of foreign aid. But, as is also clear from the literature, foreign aid is not necessarily related 
to peace building. For example, countries of Eastern Europe needed aid to cope with their 
economic transition after the 1989 color uprisings (Lancaster, 2000). 
Even though social uprisings can make donors aware of recipients’ needs, donors may actually 
decrease aid in the event of social uprisings due to fear that their projects will fail or at least be 
severely compromised because of the conflict (Knack, 2001). Therefore, there is not a direct or 
consistent relation between foreign aid allocation and social uprisings. Moreover, there is no 
reason to assume homogeneity in donor assessments of need, even when the aid is intended to 
address the same situation. For example, two donors, both with conflict resolution as a primary 
goal, could handle aid differently, depending on each donor’s assessment of the mechanisms 
underpinning the aid/conflict relationship (Kang and Meernik, 2004). 
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The effectiveness of an action, in this case, providing foreign aid, can only be measured if the 
intentions and basis for giving the support are known. The extant literature critical of foreign aid 
comes to that conclusion mainly by focusing on the debt burden aid imposes on recipients or the 
less than optimal ability of aid to actually alleviate poverty. However, these aspects are of 
relevance to the recipient country, but not necessarily to the donor, which highlights the 
importance of differentiating between donor interest and recipient need when investigating aid 
allocation. This paper takes what might be viewed as the donor’s perspective on aid in that it is 
more interested in how donor’s decide to allocate aid than it is in the said effectiveness of aid. 
The paper extends the donor interest and recipient need framework by incorporating social 
uprisings. This is done by using a novel index of social uprisings, the Social Uprisings 
Composite Indicator (SUCI), which differentiates between violent and nonviolent uprisings. This 
paper analyzes the effect of social uprisings in a recipient nation on the allocation of bilateral 
foreign aid from OECD donor nations. 
What are the determinants of foreign aid allocation? The paper answers this question, the first 
step in which is a review of the literature on this topic to find out what is already known and 
what needs to be discovered. Section 2 contains this literature review. This is followed by an 
empirical analysis that is conducted using a three-dimensional panel dataset (recipient-donor-
year) with 1,343 recipient-donor pairs covering the period from 1970 to 2011. Section 3 presents 
the dataset used for the analysis. Section 4 describes the methodology. Sections 5 and 6 contain 
the regression outputs and robustness checks, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Aid Allocation Literature Review 
 
A. Transition Aid 
Social uprisings, per se, are not the much studied in the extant literature; however, much can be 
learned from the research on transition aid, sometimes referred to as transition assistance. 
Transition aid to Eastern Europe in the 1990s was of various types (Stone, 2002). The 
effectiveness of this transition aid to eastern Europe was less than optimal due to the large 
number of small grants that were not demand driven and that were tied to specific projects set by 
the donor nations (Nuti, 1996). 
Yet, aid for Eastern Europe was viewed as a necessary element of economic transition after 1989 
(Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, 2008). The donors’ main intention in providing this transition aid was 
to support Eastern European countries in their move toward a free market and democracy 
(Lancaster, 2000). The amount and speed of aid allocated by Western countries was highly 
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dependent on the donors’ interest, which can be summarized with this statement: “the quicker 
you change the more we’ll give” (Creed and Wedel, 1997). Aid can be viewed as a foreign 
policy tool that new political leaders can wield to gain influence and assert control (Cooley, 
2003). 
In the case of social uprisings, however, it is possible that the revolutionaries might not welcome 
external support in the form of foreign aid. In the case of the Czech Republic, the government 
decided to limit its use of foreign assistance, which met with popular approval; the Czechs say 
that “reforms starts and ends at home” (Wedel, 1994). Despite the negative reaction to external 
aid on the part of some, the transition aid programs were key to these countries’ eventual EU 
accession (Grabbe, 1999). The literature contains many examples of transition states that needed 
foreign assistance to allow for their economic development (Braithwaite et al., 2000). For 
example, after the social uprisings in the Arab world, the Deauville Partnership was established 
to assist these countries in their transition (Dadush and Dunne, 2011). The downfall of several 
governments as a result of social uprisings opened up new possibilities for donor countries. The 
color revolution in Eastern Europe opened the door for this part of the world to establish a 
relationship with the West and forced the West to consider what sort of relationship this should 
be. Social uprisings resulting in a change in the governing regime can be viewed as an 
opportunity for foreign donors and creates a situation in which the “competition for economic 
rents has become more open” (Frot, 2014). Some studies illustrate how the emergence of sudden 
strategic concerns can lead to a dramatic increase in aid, or how events like the end of the Cold 
War can shift donor priorities and leverage more generally (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007; Fleck 
and Kilby, 2010). 
 
B. Aid and Social Uprisings 
There are to date no large-N studies on the effect of social uprisings from a general perspective. 
The literature provides detailed analysis of the relation between foreign aid and the 
democratization process and its effects on leader survival, but no work has been done of the 
relationship between foreign aid and social uprisings (SUs) (Bermeo, 2011; Kono and 
Montinola, 2009). This paper fills this gap by empirically evaluating the impact of social 
uprisings on aid allocation. The probable uses of foreign aid by the recipient country can have a 
significant impact on the donor’s timing of the allocation and, indeed, on whether it will even 
provide aid. After a social uprising, a country’s leaders can try to “buy off” the anti-government 
movement (Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Buying off revolutionaries can be accomplished by 
various methods; for example, “provision of public goods, freedom of assembly, transparency 
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and free press” (Mesquita and Smith, 2010, p.936). A country with substantial resources, either 
natural resources or foreign aid, is able to use its assets to counter revolutionary movements. 
Therefore, whether a donor will provide foreign aid to a recipient nation that has experienced a 
social uprising depends on whether the donor wants to support the revolutionaries or the current 
government (Bearce and Tirone, 2010). Since foreign aid is a foreign policy tool, one country’s 
long-time support of “dictators” (e.g., Western countries support of leaders in the Middle East 
prior to the Arab Spring) can make even the offer of aid to an opposing group arouse suspicion 
as to motives (Goldstone, 2011, p. 15). One example of how donors signaled their approval of a 
regime change occurred in Libya. This country was under many sanctions from the West, and yet 
the revolutionaries received humanitarian aid at an early stage of the social uprisings in Libya in 
2011 (Hurd, 2005; Ardıç, 2012). Another example of an aid allocation reaction to a social 
uprising was the U.S. announcement that it was freezing military aid to Egypt as a result of 
President Morsi being ousted from power (Faris, 2013). It is important to take a time lag into 
account when studying the effect of social uprisings on aid allocation. Events which took place 
at an earlier time point affects the donors' decisions for aid allocation. 
Literature on the impact of foreign aid on democratization highlights the influence of recipients’ 
regime type on aid allocation. It is argued that long-run aid allocation helps autocratic 
governments more than democratic ones (Kono and Montinola, 2009). An argument of extant 
literature states that autocratic government are most likely to promotes economic development in 
exchange for foreign aid (Goldstone, 2011).  
 
C. Social Uprisings and SUCI 
In the literature, it is common to find lists of events considered to be instances of unrest in a 
recipient country, with such lists including conflict, civil war, and demonstrations, among others. 
In the 1990s alone, over $100 billion were spent on assisting three dozen nations to recover from 
conflicts (Kang and Meernik, 2004). Qualitative analysis demonstrated that various types of 
conflicts in a recipient country impact donors’ aid allocation decision. However, an empirical 
analysis is difficult because  "none target and measure conflict systematically" (Balla and 
Reinhardt, 2008, p.2568). The need for a reliable index has been provided by the construction of 
the Social Uprisings Composite Indicator (SUCI) (Hayo and Shaheen, 2014). SUCI is a variable 
with a metric scale and captures both the occurrence as well as the intensity of conflicts over 
time. The index also measures social uprisings, which are defined as the “violent or non-violent 
intra-state acts of defiance by groups of citizens against a country’s government.” 
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The relevance and possible application of SUCI are illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 1, which 
use India and Colombia as example countries. Each country has its own index for both violent 
and nonviolent social uprisings per year. The mean value of violent SUCI is higher in Colombia 
than in India. The significance of the index value level is country specific. This index is the 
starting point for this paper’s analysis of the effect of social uprisings on foreign aid allocation 
decisions. 
Figure 2 shows the link between social uprisings and foreign aid allocation. The figure gives 
averages for Africa, the Eastern Block, Eastern Asia, and MENA regions. Social uprisings are 
measured using SUCI and averages for the regions are provided to facilitate the comparison. 
Similarly, total aid commitment value to recipients in million US$ is also averaged for each 
region. 
Even these average values of aid clearly demonstrate that there are regional differences in the 
relationship between foreign aid and social uprisings, which shows that  a commonly used 
approach in literature of averaging the aid value not only across regions but also over a certain 
time period may not be appropriate. The usual reason for using averages is to even out 
fluctuation across years, but such an approach results in the loss of valuable information. 
Therefore, in this study the value level of aid and SUCI is used instead. 
In the case of Africa, an increase in average social uprisings results in decrease in aid allocation. 
In contrast, in the Eastern Block, a increase in social uprisings is accompanied by a rise in aid 
allocation. Looking at the two other regions shown in Figure 2 reveals no clear link between 
social uprisings and aid allocation. 
One reason aid might be decreased in the face of more social unrest is that donors are concerned 
that aid will end up in the “wrong” party’s hands (Grossman, 1992). Another reason for 
decreasing or even stopping aid could be that continuing to send aid to a country that appears to 
be engaging in escalating conflict may make the general population of the donor country 
question the wisdom of its government (Knack, 2001). The illustrative figures and discussion of 
them lead to this paper’s first hypothesis. 
H1 Countries with high SUs receive less aid. 
 
The empirical aid allocation literature is extensive, yet it still lacks a comprehensive analysis of 
social uprisings as an important element of allocation decisions, a gap this paper intends to fill, 
which provides the foundation for the paper’s  second hypothesis 
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Table 1: SUCI Examples: India and Colombia 
  Violent Nonviolent 
  min max mean std.dev. min max mean std.dev. 
India 1119 5118 2157 1179 1154 12115 3173 2138 
Colombia 2119 9166 4156 1169 1149 3114 1199 1151 
Figure 1: SUCI Examples: India and Colombia 
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Figure 2: SUCI and Foreign aid Allocation 
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H2 Adding SUs to the list of commonly used determinants alters the regression output. 
 
This hypothesis argues that considering social uprisings in the analysis of aid allocation, as an 
addition to commonly used determinants in extant literature, may actually change the regression 
outputs and hence affect the interpretation of the determinants in those studies. Before moving to 
the empirical specification, the commonly used determinants of aid allocation are reviewed. 
 
Aid Allocation Determinants Studied in the Extant Literature 
The aid allocation literature contains a detailed analysis of the impact of the donor’s own 
macroeconomic conditions on aid allocation (Beenstock, 1980). These macroeconomic 
indicators of donors are important analytical points for studies focusing on a single nation with 
one channel of bilateral foreign aid. However, this paper takes a more comprehensive view and 
studies all the donor nations that are members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), which engages in bilateral aid allocation. Therefore, the focus is to understand donor 
reaction to social uprisings given that other commonly used dimensions are still considered. An 
overview of the literature shows that allocations are governed by donors’ geopolitical and 
commercial interests and by humanitarian motives (Younas, 2008; Gounder and Sen, 1999; 
Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 2000) 
 
Donor Geopolitical Interest 
Donor provision of foreign aid cannot be considered a unilateral transfer—that is, donors expect 
“getting something in return,” even if it is intangible (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976). In fact, 
the “something in return” is most likely to be something intangible, as a transfer of something 
tangible falls more into the category of an exchange relationship, not a donor-donee. The donor’s 
objectives are believed to have a major role in its aid allocation for the development needs of the 
recipient country (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Interestingly, the 
literature shows that corrupt governments receive as much aid as less corrupt governments 
(Alesina and Weder, 2002). 
Past studies find a bias in aid allocation against countries with larger populations. Two reasons 
have been put forth to explain this: (1) the impact of aid decreases as the population increases 
and (2) it is easier for donors to gain political influence in a smaller country (Isenman, 1976; 
Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
Based on these arguments, it is expected that in an empirical study that excludes social uprisings 
from the analysis, that countries with lower population receive more aid. 
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Donors tend to provide aid to countries that are like-minded and potential political allies. 
Moreover, there is a relationship between having a colonial past and aid receipt (Berthélemy, 
2006). Another point of comparison for the second hypothesis is that a country will provide aid 
to a recipient country that has an external political policy in alignment with that of the donor 
country. A country’s foreign policy support of a donor nation is reflected by its alliances and 
U.N. voting record (Wang, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
 
Donor Commercial Interest 
Empirical work shows that all donors have a commercial interest in providing foreign aid 
(Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004), and this is often related to the donor’s interest in acquiring a 
larger share of the recipient’s imports (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007; Bagwell and Staiger, 
2001). Empirical analyses reveal that countries with low import levels from their donors receive 
more aid. It is argued that in bilateral foreign aid allocation, the self-interest motive “dominates” 
developmental motives. Self-interest predominantly manifests as the commercial interest a donor 
has in the recipient country. On an aggregate level, commercial interest plays an even greater 
role in aid allocation than does geopolitics (Berthélemy, 2006; McKinaly, 1978). 
 
Donor Humanitarian Motives and Recipient Need 
The third reason for providing aid is the “official” one set out in donor nation’s foreign aid 
statements. Often, these reasons involve the desire to provide aid to the neediest countries or to 
those countries that are believed to be able to alleviate poverty with sound governance. For 
example, “the basic purpose of the aid program is alleviation of poverty in developing countries” 
(H. M. Treasury, 1986, p. 55). The developmental reason for providing aid is argued to have 
become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War. 
In the literature, recipient characteristics are often employed as control variables rather than 
considering them to be a reflection of need. Such characteristics include per capita income, 
infant mortality rate, and number of people affected by war or disaster (Fielding, 2013). 
Empirical work that employs only recipient need models is based on the assumption that “donors 
are purely motivated by humanitarian motives” (Gounder and Sen, 1999), and the literature 
provides a long list of variables intended to capture this important dimension of aid allocation. 
The most commonly used variable for measuring humanitarian motives, however, is GDP per 
capita. Hence, countries with low GDP per capita receive more aid. 
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3. Data 
An unbalanced panel dataset with 20,085 observations covering the time period 1970 to 2011 is 
used for the empirical analysis. The panel is constructed to pair donors with recipients, hence 
making it possible to analyze all donors’ aid allocations at the same time. This dataset moves this 
study beyond the single donor model commonly used in the extant empirical literature. 
Specifically, the dataset is a three-dimensional (donor-recipient-year) panel of 1,343 paired 
donor-recipient groups. 
 
A. The Dependent Variable 
The extant empirical literature uses an average of aid allocation to recipient nations as the 
dependent variable. This averaging approach is not taken in this study as doing so would result in 
the loss of valuable information. This study instead takes a donor-based approach in which the 
donor aid allocation to a certain recipient nation at one point in time, in this case yearly, is 
considered. 
The dependent variable of aid allocation in the empirical regression is aid commitment, which is 
defined as “a written obligation by a government to provide resources of a specific amount for 
the benefit of a recipient country” (OECD, 2014). The choice of aid commitments over aid 
disbursements or aid per capita is consistent with the consensus in the literature that it is a better 
reflection of donor aid allocation decisions (McGillivray, 1989; Tarp et al., 1999; Berthélemy, 
2006). The aid commitment data for are obtained from the OECD Stats for Aid data. The aid 
commitments are included as a percentage of the respective donor’s GDP. This approach of 
making the dependent variable a percentage of GDP is taken to avoid a bias for countries with 
higher aid allocation budgets. The aim of the study is to analyze a donor’s allocation decision to 
provide aid to a recipient nation by looking at the amount of aid as a percentage of its GDP 
value. This allows the empirical model to analyze the allocation decision for even a relatively 
low amount of aid, but which is, in fact, a considerable percentage of this respective donor’s 
GDP. 
 
B. The Independent Variables 
The Social Uprisings Composite Indicator (SUCI) with its two components is used as the key 
independent variable for the empirical model. SUCI is a quantitative variable that measures the 
occurrence and intensity of social uprisings in a country per year (Hayo and Shaheen, 2014). 
Social uprisings are defined as violent or nonviolent intrastate acts of defiance by groups of 
citizens against a country’s government. “Defiance” includes demonstrations, revolutions, riots, 
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revolts, strikes, and coups. “Groups of citizens” include political parties, organized groups, 
students, workers, and general public support. 
The presence of a unit root in a variable can affect the regression estimates (Levin et al., 2002). 
There are two tests for the unit root that can be performed on a panel dataset. The first is the 
Levin-Lin-Chiu, which requires a strongly balance panel; the second is the Dicky-Fuller test, 
which accepts an unbalanced dataset (Im and Shin, 2003). Both tests were conducted on the 
SUCI panel data; for the first test, the data were restricted to be a balanced panel. The two unit 
root tests were significant at the 1% level, indicating that SUCI is stationary. This highly 
significant result means that the variable can be used in the empirical model with a stationary 
assumption (MacDonald, 1996). 
Note that since the violent and nonviolent social uprisings were computed based on two factor 
loadings in the factor analysis they are not correlated and it is thus empirically sound to include 
both violent and nonviolent SUCI in the regression analysis. 
In addition to SUCI, variables commonly used in the aid allocation literature are included as 
control variables: population, GDP, donor export percentage to recipient, and U.N. General 
Assembly voting. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables used in the empirical model. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source 
Aid % GDP 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.67 OECD (2014) 
Violent 2.20 0.92 0.73 10.06 
Hayo and Shaheen (2014) 
Nonviolent 2.19 1.10 1.21 18.69 
Population log 3.39 1.60 0.02 7.19 
World Bank (2014) 
GDP log 11.10 1.78 6.40 16.35 
Export% 0.30 0.64 0.00 13.09 Barbieri and Keshk ( 2012) 
U.N. vote 0.75 0.17 -0.42 1.00 Voeten (2013) 
 
Population is among the most commonly used control variables in empirical analyses of aid 
allocation irrespective of the study’s research focus, and a “small country effect” has been 
identified (Cashel-Gordo and Craig, 1997; McGillivray, 1989; Dollar and Levin, 2006). The 
OECD interprets this phenomenon as reflecting smaller countries’ need for more aid to finance 
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their imports (Dudley and Claude, 1976), which contradicts the common assumption that heavily 
populated countries need more aid than less populated ones (McGillivray, 1989). 
Another macroeconomic variable is GDP per capita, which reflects the recipient nation’s needs. 
The macroeconomic variables are obtained from the World Bank database, and are the most 
conventional recipient need indicators (Neumayer, 2003). GDP is used to reflect a recipient 
nation’s level of development (Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz, 2009). In the literature, it is 
argued that foreign aid is provided to countries with lower levels of GDP (Kang and Meernik, 
2004). 
As a measure for commercial interest, the value of the donor’s exports to a recipient country as a 
percent of the donor’s total exports is used to reflect the recipient nation’s potential commercial 
importance for the donor. As argued in the literature, a recipient nation with lower imports from 
the donor is expected to receive higher aid to motivate higher trade levels. 
Finally, U.N. voting is employed to measure political alignment. This variable can take values 
from –1 to 1, where –1 means having the least similar votes and 1 is fully aligned voting in the 
U.N. General Assembly (Voeten, 2013). U.N. votes is a commonly used variable to reflect two 
nations’ similar ideologies. It is argued that there is greater aid allocation to recipient nations that 
have voting patterns similar to those of the donor country. 
 
4. Methodology 
The data are analyzed using fixed effects with robust standard errors. This approach is takes so 
as to achieve a robust empirical analysis, given the large dataset of 20,085 observations. To 
handle this dataset in such a way as to make use of all possible information, two adjustments 
need to be made. 
First, all regressors are lagged by one year. In the aid allocation literature, explanatory variables 
measuring either recipient need or donor interest are “likely to be endogenous” to aid (Dalgaard 
et al., 2004, p. 193). Therefore, explanatory variables were not included as level values to avoid 
problems of endogeneity (Miguel et al., 2004). Instead, lagged values of independent variables 
are included in the empirical model (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). To aid 
in understanding the lag effect on aid allocation, a lag of one year is applied to all control 
variables. Another conceptual argument for not having the level values for both dependent and 
independent variables is that decisions and their underlying determinants do not occur 
instantaneously. Foreign aid decision making is not equivalent across all donor nations or in all 
situations. For example, foreign aid in response to humanitarian and conflict crises tends to be a 
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relatively quick reaction to an event rather than a routine yearly budget appropriation 
(Margesson, 2006). 
Second, all regressors in the empirical model were interacted with donor dummy variables. This 
approach was taken due to the extant literature’s identification of donor motives as 
heterogeneous (Berthélemy, 2006; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). This approach provides a 
coefficient for each donor for every independent variable, thus allowing for donor-specific 
determinants for aid allocation decision .Since the panel is set in a three-dimensional setting 
(donor-recipient-year), the fixed effects are for the pairs of donor-recipients in the model. 
Finally, it is important to note that some literature argues that it can take an average of three or 
even five years of aid to even out foreign aid shocks (Landau, 1986; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
However, given that this paper’s main interest is to study the impact of social uprisings, among 
other determinants, on aid allocation, such a long time perspective is inappropriate. Social 
uprisings are sudden and unexpected actions (Kecskemeti, 1961; Castells, 2013). Therefore, this 
paper follows other aid allocation literature that takes aid allocation values on yearly basis and, 
for reasons previously stated, does not follow the averaging approach (Fielding, 2013). To 
control for temporal variation in the data, year dummies are included in the model. 
 
5. Regression Output 
The fixed effects regression is conducted twice on the same sample. For the first hypothesis (H1), 
the first regression is conducted on a model including social uprisings (M1). For the second 
hypothesis (H2), it will be necessary to compare M1 with a model that excludes social uprisings 
(M2). The output for the two regressions including and excluding SUCI variables is set out in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. To make the output table easily interpretable, all donor nations’ 
interaction terms are presented by rows, thus identifying every donor with its own regressors. 
The control variables are presented in columns, starting with the key variables of interest—the 
SUCI variable, with its violent and nonviolent components. The remainder of the columns show 
controls derived from the extant literature: population, GDP per capita, export percentage to 
recipient, and voting in the U.N. General Assembly. Note that Tables 3 and 4 only show 
coefficients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Comprehensive tables with all 
coefficients, standard deviations, and year dummies for the models including and excluding 
SUCI are presented in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2). 
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Table 3: M1 Regression Output 
 
Violent Nonviolent Population GDP pc Export% U.N. vote 
Australia 0.002*** -0.006*** 0.043*** -0.017*** 0.003*** 0.031*** 
Austria 
  
0.009** 
   Belgium -0.001*** 
     Canada 
      Czech -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.052*** 0.022*** -0.022** 
 Denmark 
     
0.041** 
Finland 
     
0.032*** 
France 
      Germany 
   
-0.003* 
  Greece 
   
-0.004** -0.001*** 
 Ireland 
  
0.012*** 
   Italy 
  
0.004** 
  
-0.009*** 
Japan 
      Korea 
   
0.004** 
 
0.013*** 
Luxembourg -0.002** 
     Netherlands 
   
-0.008** 
  New Zealand -0.005*** 0.009*** -0.165*** 0.017*** -0.005*** 0.013*** 
Norway 
   
-0.008** 0.021** 
 Portugal 
 
-0.027** 
    Slovak -0.003** 
     Spain -0.001** -0.001*** -0.013** 
   Sweden 
 
-0.001** 
    U.K. 
   
-0.003* 
 
0.005** 
U.S. 
  
0.005** -0.003** 
  Positive 4% 4% 21% 12% 8% 24% 
Negative 25% 21% 13% 29% 13% 4% 
Explained 29% 25% 33% 42% 21% 29% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Observations 20,085  
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Table 4: M2 Regression output 
 
Population GDPpc Export U.N. vote 
Australia 0.045*** -0.019*** 0.002** 0.026*** 
Austria 0.008** 
 
0.004* 
 Belgium 
    Canada 
    Czech 
    Denmark 
   
0.034** 
Finland 
   
0.031*** 
France 
    Germany 
   
0.003* 
Greece 
 
-0.003** -0.001*** 
 Ireland 0.012*** 
   Italy 0.005** 
  
-0.007*** 
Japan 
    Korea 
 
0.004** 
 
0.017*** 
Luxembourg 
    Netherlands 
 
-0.007** 0.006* 
 New Zealand -0.168*** 0.036*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
Norway 
 
-0.006** 0.014** 
 Portugal 
    Spain -0.006* 
   Sweden -0.030* 
   U.K. 
 
-0.002* 
 
0.005** 
U.S. 0.004** -0.002** 0.0001* 
 Positive 22% 9% 30% 30% 
Negative 13% 26% 
 
4% 
Explained 35% 35% 30% 35% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Observations 20,085 
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The first step in the analysis, before analyzing any particularities, is to look at the global 
outcome, for which the last three rows—“Positive,” “Negative,” and “Explained”—are of great 
assistance. “Positive” refers to the percentage of significant coefficients with a positive value, 
meaning a higher share of aid to GDP. “Negative” refers to the percentage of significant 
coefficients with a negative value, meaning that the aid share allocated by donors has been 
decreased. “Explained” is the percentage of all “positive” and “negative” coefficients that have 
significant values. 
Starting with the “Explained” row, at first glance it seems that both SUCI variables (i.e., violent 
and nonviolent) have explanatory power comparable to that of the variables commonly used in 
the literature, such as exports and U.N. votes. This comparable outcome highlights the 
importance of including social uprisings in the analysis of aid allocation. In fact, both violent 
SUCI and U.N. vote have 29% explanatory power. Moreover, the nonviolent SUCI’s 29% 
explanatory power actually surpasses the export percentage variable, which is 21%. On the other 
hand, both GDP and population have higher explanatory power than the SUCI variables. The 
regression in Table 4, which excludes social uprisings, overstates the importance and 
significance of U.N. votes in aid allocation decisions. In M2, U.N. vote reaches 35% explanatory 
power, but when including social uprisings (M1), this reduces this to 29%. Adding social 
uprisings to the model does not have any effect on GDP and population, which continue to have 
high and, in some cases, even higher explanatory power in the model containing social uprisings. 
In regard to the control variables’ significance, whether it be “positive” or “negative,” it is 
important to remember that this analysis is not based on an assumption of donor homogeneity as 
donor motives are different and it is necessary to analyze such differences. Table 3 shows that 
nearly all donors that have significant violent SUCI, except Australia, have negative coefficients. 
Looking more closely at the case of Australia, it appears that the major reason for this positive 
link is due to Australia’s generous foreign aid allocation to its former colony Papua New Guinea 
(PNG). Australia is the largest foreign aid provider to PNG, donating “$300 million a year” 
(Feeny, 2005, p. 1095). Other than Australia, the 25% explained positive significance shows that 
an increase in the violent SUCI indicator decreases the aid share of the donor country. 
Nonviolent SUCI have a similar negative link to foreign aid allocation; 21% of the countries 
have a negative significant coefficient. The exception to this in the case of nonviolent SUCI is 
New Zealand with its bilateral aid links to the Philippines (Round and Odedokun, 2004). Bearing 
in mind the assumption of non-homogeneity among donors, H1 cannot be rejected as Table 3 
empirically show a negative link between both of SUCI components and aid allocation. Hence, 
countries with a high level of social uprising receive less aid from donor nations. 
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In the theoretical literature, it is expected that there will be a positive significant link between 
export and bilateral aid (Berthélemy, 2006). This expectation is only met in M2, the model 
excluding social uprisings (see Table 4). And indeed, this expectation of a significant positive 
link is not found in any of the extant empirical literature (Fielding, 2013). M1, the model 
including social uprisings (see Table 3), sheds light on this disconnect between theory and the 
extant literature empirical findings.  
There are two main difference between M1 and M2. The first is the change in the interpretation of 
the link between exports and aid allocation. Including social uprisings in M1 results in having a 
13% negative coefficient, which is in strong contrast to M2’s 30% positive coefficient in aid 
allocation and 0% negative coefficients. This results supports the argument of non homogeneity 
among donor nation decisions. Donors can actually increase aid allocation to countries they have 
a lower level of export with in an attempt to foster commercial cooperation. The second 
difference is that the explanatory power of U.N votes is overstated in M2. Thus, the results fail to 
reject H2. Including social uprisings does in fact change the output results. 
The small country effect is not found in either M1 nor M2. Both regression results show a 
significant positive coefficient linking population and foreign aid allocation. That is, a more 
populous country is expected to receive more aid. 
One of the regressions’ most interesting results is the revealed variation across countries. In the 
literature, it is typically assumed that there is one reaction to each of the control variables and 
hence that is what the empirical findings present. However, these analyses are not based on a 
panel data model that differentiates across donor countries. The output of the regression 
presented in this study shows that countries are not uniform in their preferences or interests. This 
finding indicates that by averaging aid allocation across donor nations a great deal of information 
is lost and that lost information can explain how countries actually behave. 
 
6. Robustness Check 
A fixed effects model was chosen for the analysis conducted in this paper to benefit from its 
robustness. With a dataset including more than 20,000 observations, robustness, rather than 
efficiency was the major criteria for model selection. Nevertheless, a random effects model, 
using the same sample, is employed in this section as a robustness check. There are, indeed, a 
few differences in the results of the two models, but in general the output is very similar and the 
results of the random effects model support the main study findings. 
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Table 5 : M1 Random Effects  
 
Violent Nonviolent Population GDP pc Export U.N. vote 
Australia 0.004*** -0.007*** 0.024*** -0.003*** 0.002** 0.032*** 
Austria 
  
0.002** 
 
0.005* -0.009** 
Belgium -0.002*** 
     Canada 
  
0.003*** -0.002*** 
  Czech -0.0004* -0.004*** 
  
0.003** 
 Denmark 
 
0.004* 0.009*** -0.005** 
 
0.037* 
Finland -0.001** 
 
0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
0.021** 
France 
  
0.002*** -0.001*** 
  Germany 
  
0.002*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 Greece -0.0004*** 
 
0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002** 
Ireland 
    
-0.003** -0.015*** 
Italy 
  
0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.011*** 
Japan 
  
0.005** 
   Korea 
  
0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004** 
 Luxembourg -0.003** 
     Netherlands 
  
0.007*** -0.003*** 
  New 
Zealand -0.008*** 0.012*** -0.119*** -0.006*** -0.010*** 0.011*** 
Norway 
 
0.002* 0.005*** -0.003*** 0.019** 0.017* 
Portugal 0.004** 
 
0.013* -0.011** 
  Slovak 
   
-0.001** 
  Spain -0.001*** -0.0004*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.005*** 
 Sweden 
  
0.011*** -0.009*** 
 
0.076*** 
U.K. 
  
0.004*** -0.002*** 
  U.S. 
  
0.002*** -0.002*** 0.0002** -0.003*** 
Positive 8% 13% 75% 
 
38% 25% 
Negative 29% 13% 4% 75% 13% 21% 
explained 38% 25% 79% 75% 50% 46% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10                  Observations 20,085 
 
The main difference between the fixed effect and random effect models is the change in sign for 
the export percentage to recipient, indicating an increase in aid to those recipients with high 
imports from the donors. Similar to the fixed effects output, the social uprisings violent variable 
has a negative coefficient. The nonviolent social uprisings variable in the random effects model 
is inconclusive, with equivalent outputs for both negative and positive coefficients. Therefore, 
from the random effects model, it can be concluded that in the event of a violent social uprising, 
donors provide less aid. Again, no small country effect is found by the random effect model, 
confirming the expectation that more populous countries will receive more aid. 
An area for future research would be to include specific aid sectors, for example, humanitarian 
aid, in the analysis. Restricted data availability did not allow estimating the full model in such an 
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attempt and U.N. vote had to be excluded from the analysis. Table A3 in the Appendix provides 
the reduced model using aid share as the dependent variable for sound comparison. Nearly all 
previous conclusions hold when using humanitarian aid as the dependent variable. For example, 
violent SUCI is negative, the small country effect is rejected, and aid to recipients with a lower 
share of exports so as to foster commercial cooperation are all still valid outcomes in the 
humanitarian aid analysis. 
Table 6: Humanitarian Aid 
  Violent Nonviolent Population GDP Export 
Australia 3.15*** -12.17***   0.123*** 34.82*** 
Austria       2.544* -0.73*** 
Belgium       -34.49*   
Czech         172.4** 
Denmark     343.4** -108.6**   
Finland   -1.09**       
France     30.57**     
Germany     32.55*     
Korea         -52.15** 
Luxembourg     47.06*     
Netherlands     22.72**     
New Zealand -3.94*** 55.87***   -35.96*** -25.79*** 
Norway         -70.42*** 
Portugal -0.92**   26.95**     
Slovak       5.564*   
Spain -4.01*** 9.54* 86.83***     
Sweden       -25.91**   
U.K.     156.6*** -18.91*   
Positive 5% 9% 36% 14% 9% 
Negative 14% 9%   23% 18% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  Observations 5,136 
 
7. Conclusion 
Despite the considerable empirical research on foreign aid, the determinants of aid allocation are 
still not completely understood. Several empirical approaches, ranging from pooled OLS to 
GMM dynamic models, have been taken to study the effect of donor geopolitical, commercial, 
and humanitarian interests on aid allocation, all of which include a long list of determinants, but 
as yet the findings have been inconclusive. Hence, there is a need not only to use new 
methodological approaches but also to refine the conceptual approach to foreign aid 
determinants. 
The current paper takes a step in this direction by looking at how social uprisings in the recipient 
country affect donor foreign aid allocation by employing the newly constructed Social Uprisings 
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Composite Indicator (SUCI), which measures not only the occurrence but also the intensity of 
social uprising in a large sample of countries on an annual basis. 
Taking a donor perspective approach, this paper offers an empirical analysis of aid allocation 
determinants that adds SUCI to the list of variables usually employed in this line of research. The 
analysis was performed on globally representative panel dataset of 20,085 observations covering 
the time period from 1970 to 2011. The data set encompasses 1,343 pairs of recipient-donor 
groups, hence providing a three-dimensional panel dataset—recipient-donor-year. Results from 
the fixed effects analysis support the theoretically-based argument that social uprisings influence 
aid allocation. SUCI has explanatory power comparable to that of more commonly used 
variables, such as GDP, U.N. voting, and population. The empirical results show that excluding 
social uprisings from an analysis of aid allocation changes the significance of other commonly 
used variables. Therefore, researchers in the field of foreign aid who omit social uprisings from 
their analyses risk model mis-specification and may arrive at erroneous conclusions. 
In this paper’s empirical analysis,  donor-recipient homogeneity was relaxed, allowing for paired 
countries specific effects. The output shows that social uprising has an explanatory power of 
33%. However, due to the heterogeneity assumed to exist in the dataset, the direction of the 
effect is inconclusive. A negative significant effect on aid allocation is predominant in the output 
results, meaning that a country experiencing a high level of social uprising is less likely to 
receive a high share of a donor’s aid allocation budget. 
There remains a great deal of room for future research. For example, a dynamic panel fixed 
effect model could be very useful in understanding how previous aid allocation influences 
current aid decisions. Also, it would be very interesting to study interactions other than those 
between recipients and donors, for example, interactions between various donor groups. Foreign 
aid allocation decisions might actually be subject to some underlying coordination among donor 
groups. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Fixed Effect M1 
 
Constant 0.028*** 1980.year 0.001 1990.year 0.0004 
  (0.008)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1973.year 0.002 1981.year 0.001 1991.year 0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1974.year 0.002 1982.year 0.001 1992.year 0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1975.year 0.002 1983.year 0.001 1993.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1976.year 0.001 1984.year 0.002 1994.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1977.year 0.003 1985.year 0.001 1995.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1978.year 0.004** 1986.year 0.002 1996.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
1979.year 0.002 1987.year 0.001 1997.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
2000.year -0.001 1988.year 0.001 1998.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
2001.year -0.001 1989.year 0.001 1999.year -0.001 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
2002.year -0.001 2003.year 0.001 
  
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
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Table A1 cont’d: Fixed Effect M1 
Fixed Effect Violent Nonviolent Population GDP pc Export U.N. vote 
U.S. -0.0002 0.0001 0.005** -0.003** 0.0002 -0.001 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) 
Canada -0.0001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.011 0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
U.K. -0.001 0.0001 0.003 -0.003* -0.0003 0.005** 
  (0.001) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ireland -0.001* 0.0002 0.012*** -0.001 0.001 -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Netherlands -0.0002 0.0002 0.005 -0.008** 0.006 0.004 
  (0.0004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Belgium -0.001*** -0.002 -0.039 0.015 0.015 0.006 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.013) (0.023) (0.005) 
Luxembourg -0.003** -0.0001 0.035 -0.019 0.001 0.010 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.027) (0.048) (0.013) 
France -0.0001 -0.0001 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spain -0.001** -0.001*** -0.013** -0.003 0.003 0.001 
  (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Portugal 0.003 -0.027** -0.177* 0.041 -0.017 0.031 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.099) (0.038) (0.029) (0.019) 
Germany 0.0001 0.0002 -0.001 -0.003* 0.003 0.002 
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Austria -0.001 0.001 0.009** -0.003 0.005* -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Czech -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.052*** 0.022*** -0.023** -0.0012 
  (0.0001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
Italy 0.0004* 0.0004 0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Greece -0.0002 0.0001 -0.005 -0.004** -0.001*** -0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.001) 
Finland -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.001 0.032*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
Sweden -0.003 -0.001** -0.034* -0.007 0.025 0.012 
  (0.002) (0.0003) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) 
Norway -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.008** 0.021** -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Denmark -0.002 0.004* -0.012 0.002 0.033 0.041** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.025) (0.012) 
Korea -0.0003 0.0004 -0.002 0.004** -0.001 0.013*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.00175) (0.0004) (0.005) 
Japan -0.0003 -0.001 0.008 -0.0004 -0.001 0.004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.005) (0.001) (0.011) 
Australia 0.003*** -0.006*** 0.043*** -0.017*** 0.003*** 0.031*** 
  (0.0003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
New Zealand -0.005*** 0.009*** -0.165*** 0.017*** -0.005*** 0.013*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
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Table A2: Fixed Effect M2 
 
Population GDP pc Export U.N. vote 
 
    U.S. 0.004** -0.002** 0.0001* -0.001 
 
1972 -0.001 1996 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Canada -0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.003 
 
1973 0.001 1997 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
 
  (0.001)   (0.002) 
U.K. 0.002 -0.002* -0.0004 0.005** 
 
1974 0.002 1998 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
  (0.001)   (0.002) 
Ireland 0.012*** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
1975 0.002 1999 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Netherlands 0.005 -0.007** 0.006* 0.004 
 
1976 0.001 2000 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Belgium -0.040 0.016 0.018 0.008 
 
1977 0.002 2001 -0.001 
 
(0.027) (0.012) (0.027) (0.005) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Luxembourg 0.032 -0.012 -0.006 0.007 
 
1978 0.003* 2002 -0.0004 
 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.011) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
France 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 
1979 0.002 2003 0.0002 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Spain -0.006* -0.002 -0.0001 0.001 
 
1980 0.001 1994 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Portugal 0.004 -0.008 -0.026 0.022 
 
1981 0.001 1995 -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.037) (0.028) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002) 
Germany -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.003* 
 
1982 0.001 Constant 0.021*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
  (0.002)   (0.007) 
Austria 0.008** -0.003 0.004* -0.003 
 
1983 0.001 
  
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Czech -0.010 0.006 0.0002 0.001 
 
1984 0.002 
  
 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Italy 0.005** -0.001 -0.001 -0.007*** 
 
1985 0.001 
  
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Greece -0.004 -0.003** -0.001*** 0.00004 
 
1986 0.002 
  
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Finland 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.032*** 
 
1987 0.001 
  
 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Sweden -0.030* -0.008 0.014 -0.001 
 
1988 0.0004 
  
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Norway -0.004 -0.006** 0.014** -0.003 
 
1989 0.001 
  
 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Denmark -0.003 0.001 0.026 0.034** 
 
1990 0.0007 
  
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.021) (0.016) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Korea 0.003 0.003** -0.001 0.017*** 
 
1991 0.001 
  
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.005) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Japan 0.006 0.0002 -0.001 0.006 
 
1992 0.004 
  
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.001) (0.010) 
 
  (0.002) 
  Australia 0.045*** -0.019*** 0.002** 0.026*** 
 
1993 -0.001 
  
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
  (0.002) 
  New Zealand -0.168*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
     
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Paper 4: The Impact of Social Uprisings on Aid Allocation  
129 
Table A3: Fixed Effects Aid Share Restricted Model  
 
Violent Nonviolent Population GDP Export 
Australia -0.0002*** -0.012*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.018*** 
Austria 
    
-0.002** 
Belgium 
   
-0.017* 
 Czech 
     Denmark -0.004** 
  
-0.084* 
 Finland 
     France 
  
0.086* -0.023* 
 Germany 
   
0.006* 
 Greece 
     Ireland 
     Italy 
    
-0.006* 
Japan 
     Korea 
 
-0.002*** 
   Luxembourg 
     Netherlands 
    
-0.001** 
Norway 
   
-0.011* 
 Portugal 
     Slovak 
     Spain 
     Sweden 
   
-0.017** 
 U.K. 
     Positive 
  
5% 5% 
 Negative 9% 9% 
 
27% 18% 
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